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Abstract
The high leverage of financial institutions is seen as a relevant factor to explain the
last global financial crisis. Risk’s over-taking by banks has brought great costs to the
economies of several countries. For this reason, the Basel Committee recommended the
establishment of operational limits, including leverage. For the Brazilian case, it is im-
portant to know how leverage influences banks’ risk taking and how it affects financial
stability. Previous results for the US pointed out by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) show
that, when the financial crisis of 2007 emerged, banks had to deleverage their positions,
amplifying the downward pressure on assets price, especially for banks that were engaged
in off-balance sheet operations. In the Brazilian case, the results show that the measure-
ment of leverage carried out by the Basel Committee is relevant for the determination of
institution risk as measured by z-score. Considering specific segments of banks, such as
non-commercial ones, some types of transactions are riskier, such as derivative operations,
or less risky, such as off-balance operations. For commercial banks, it was verified the im-
portance of monitoring typical financial intermediation variables, such as the composition
of assets and deposits of financial institutions, in order to mitigate the banking system’s
risk. Thus, the results of the study bring important insights to market agents and to
banking regulation.
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The excessive leverage of financial institutions is indicated as being a relevant factor in
explaining the last global financial crisis (Miele and Sales, 2011, p. 293). The 2007 crisis
highlighted the impact that the banking sector can have on the economy in turbulent
situations. Innovation in the banking sector and financial engineering led to the develop-
ment of new products for the financial market; however, this also brought new forms of
risk and greater challenges for regulating them.
Thus, the traditional form of banking intermediation between savers and borrowers has
become more complex, making banks more exposed to and willing to take risks. However,
given the financial innovations, the risks assumed were little known. Consequently, the
inappropriate measurement of these new forms of financial intermediation increased the
so-called leverage of the banks.
Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014, p. 3) argued that, in general, financial leverage is
part of the underlying characteristic of banks. Traditionally, leverage came from formal
debts; however, according to the authors, in the years before the crisis of 2007, banks were
transferring part of their leverage off the balance sheets, due to the emergence of the use
of financial engineering techniques that masked the real leverage of these institutions.
When the financial crisis of 2007 emerged, banks had to scrap their positions, ex-
panding the process of depreciating asset prices. Thus, according to the authors, this
procyclical process was most relevant for large and systemically important institutions
that were engaged in off-balance sheet operations (Papanikolaou and Wolff, 2014, p. 3).
Banks that demonstrated more intense earnings management prior to the 2007 crisis
also presented greater risk in the stock market. Thus, according to the authors, these
movements should be warning signals for regulators to prevent future problems in the
banking system (Cohen et al., 2014, p. 171). Gibson et al. (2018) use a measure of
systemic vulnerability in european banking system and find evidence of rising vulnerability
prior to 2007 crisis.
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Additionally, the capital structure of the banking system differs from that of traditional
firms. Banks are extremely leveraged. Accordingly, these institutions must maintain their
own capital to support unforeseen losses that are consequently not provided for. Thus,
the requirement of indicators that measure the minimum level of capital are important in
the context of banking regulation.
Gjerde and Semmen (1995) analysed the effectiveness of risk-based capital indicators
when bank deposits are fully insured. They specified an optimal set of asset risk weights,
and the results show that when deviations from the optimal risk weights occurred, a
combination of a leverage constraint and a risk-based capital indicator appears to be a
more appropriate approach to risk control.
Blum (2008, p. 1699) suggested that banking regulation, within the scope of the Basel
Accords, needs an indicator for leverage restriction and proposed the use of a leverage
indicator in conjunction with risk-based capital requirements. According to the author,
given that information about risk is provided by the banks themselves and that the
authorities are limited in identifying and sanctioning non-honest banks, an additional
risk-independent leverage indicator should be adopted to induce disclosure about risk
that is free from bias by the banks.
According to Jarrow (2013), the leverage indicator controls the same risks as the
capital adequacy rules based on the Value-at-Risk (VaR). Dermine (2015) stated that the
Leverage Ratio establishes a floor for the risk-weighted capital indicator.
Kuzubaş. et al. (2016) used heterogeneous leverage (different leverage between banking
institutions) to analyse systemic risk. The results showed that the presence of heteroge-
neous leverage markedly changes the systemic effects of default and the nature of the
contagion in the interbank markets.
Studies published in the finance and economics literature support the adoption – via
banking regulations – of mechanisms to limit the high level of leverage of such institutions.
However, it is worth noting that the use of the leverage indicator is not new for certain
countries (e.g., USA and Canada) that had already been using it in supervisory activity
before Basel III (Miele and Sales, 2011, p. 293). Canadian banks are a good case study
in this regard, as they have been subject to a regulatory leverage indicator since the early
1980s (Crawford et al., 2009).
Given the importance attributed to banking leverage in recent years, especially after
the 2007 crisis, it is important to highlight how this issue is discussed in the literature, es-
pecially in the form of capital regulation. Many important works have been and are being
conducted in relation to banking leverage – particularly, the great predominance of studies
after the recent crisis, after which the number of publications has grown significantly.
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Studies by Blum (2008); Chen and Mazumdar (1994); Evanoff and Wall (2001); Mor-
gan (2002); Saunders and Wilson (2001) showed the importance of banking leverage before
the financial crisis started in 2007, especially regarding the objects of study of asymmetric
information and moral hazard. After the crisis, studies sought to relate leveraging to the
following topics: business cycles (Aymanns et al., 2016; Aymanns and Farmer, 2015; Brei
and Gambacorta, 2016; Valencia and Bolaños, 2018); monetary policy (Angeloni and Faia,
2013); systemic risk (Aymanns et al., 2016; Aymanns and Farmer, 2015; López-Espinosa
et al., 2012; Papanikolaou and Wolff, 2014; Tasca et al., 2014); and financial stability
(Kiema and Jokivuolle, 2014; Papanikolaou and Wolff, 2014).
Thus, the objective of this work is to identify the influence of leverage in determining
risk for the Brazilian banking system. First of all, it presents a bibliographic review of
studies of bank leverage within the context of the prudent regulation of capital. The
research and systematic analysis of the main articles related to leverage in relation to
banking institutions have made it possible to consolidate our knowledge and identify
prospective areas for research. This work seeks to verify how leverage is being studied
in the literature and linked to studies of bank and economic performance, and suggests
other gaps that need to be explored in future studies. Secondly, based on the work of
Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014), it verifies empirically that leverage influences risk taking
by Brazilian banks and examines how it affects financial stability.
Our justification for the analysis of the banking system is the importance of verifying
the degree of bank leverage within the context of the possible financial instability of these
entities and the resulting alterations in the structure of capital which may lead to high
costs for the economy and society.
The results of this bibliometric analysis point to financial stability as an important
subject of study in relation to leverage, in addition to credit risk. There is a gap in studies
of this subject for emerging nations and also a gap in the interaction of macroprudential
and microprudential studies of this area. The results of a meta-analysis of the data
indicate that the determinants of the capital structure of banking, for example the work
of Gropp and Heider (2010), should be considered as well as the keywords banking, capital,
regulation and Basel.
The results of this empirical study show that these insights matter to the regulators
and agents of the financial market. The proxy of leverage for on-balance sheet, derivative,
off-balance sheet and repo operations related to the individual risk of banks measured by
the zscore, shows that the leverage for on-balance sheet operations and macroeconomic
variables, such as PIB, influence the stability of the banking system. Considering the
banking segment specifically as well as commercial banks, asset and liability composition
variables (control variables) are important risk factors. For treasury or non-commercial
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banks, derivative operations are riskier.
In this manner, this work presents the following contributions to the financial and
economic literature:
(i) it gathers together published studies of capital leverage within the context of the
banking system, which furthers the understanding and classification of leverage studies
in finance and economics;
(ii) it verifies how leverage influences banks risk taking and how it affects financial
stability.
The rest of this work is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 consists of a
review of the literature. Chapter 3 presents the empirical study. Chapter 4 presents the
results of this empirical study, and Chapter 5 consists of the study’s concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Review of the literature
For the definition of the group of articles that represent banking leverage in the context of
the regulatory and risk exposure environment, this literature review follows the research
method suggested by Junior and Filho (2010, p. 14-15), Seuring (2013, p. 1513), Jabbour
(2013, p. 144-145 ), and Silva et al. (2017, p. 92-93). The Scopus database was used,
together with the search for the words leverag* and basel or regulat* and bank* or financial
institution* and risk*.
Association of Business Schools (ABS) in the areas of Finance and Economics, Econo-
metrics, and Statistics was adopted to restrict the evaluation to important journals in the
area of finance and economics. Furthermore, all the selected articles were written in the
English language.
In the first evaluation, on August 17, 2017, 133 articles were found using the previously
defined filters. On November 6, 2017, a new round of research was conducted with the
same criteria, and no additional articles were found. On June 21, 2018, 155 articles
were found - 22 articles in addition to those found previously. The following were not
analysed for selection of the sample’s final set: one article that had been duplicated in
the database, one article that did not conform to the subject being studied (an article
from the electric sector), and one article that was not available for download. A latest
new round of research was conducted on January 10, 2019 and 8 articles more was found.
Thus, the final sample consisted of 160 articles.
In relation to the categorization scheme of the articles, this present study follows the
method of Silva et al. (2017, p. 94), who conducted a bibliometric review related to the
topic of systemic risk.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the main features of the articles published on the topic,
including, for example, the following: the specific study object and the type of focus
institutions of the related articles; the types of studies done (theoretical or empirical);
the type of approach (quantitative or qualitative); the method used; the type of data
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analysed; and, in the case of quantitative studies, the scope (one country or more than
one country), the context (developed or emerging countries), the time period studied, and
if they offer new perspectives or are consistent with previously published studies.
Regarding the objects of study, based on the study of the literature and the researcher’s
evaluation, the themes that are related to banking leverage were listed. It should be
emphasized that the resulting attribution of the object(s) of study to each article is linked
to the analysis of the author, in accordance with the reading of the texts.
Additionally, in relation to the objects of Table 2.1, the groupings of microprudential
and macroprudential objects (groups in which each object is located) – which are based
on the banking regulation policy in practice since the last financial crisis – were assigned,
in accordance with Vinais (2013) and Borio (2003).
According to Galati and Moessner (2011), prior to the financial crisis of 2007, macroe-
conomic policies – especially monetary policy – aimed for the stability of prices and prod-
ucts and were treated in a way not associated with the so-called microprudential policies,
which basically individually analyse the minimum limits and provisions of financial insti-
tutions. After the financial crisis of 2007, it was necessary to analyse the macroeconomic
policies that incorporate the behaviour of the financial system, which began being done
through the implementation of macroprudential policies. According to this denomination,
a macroprudential policy is that which, above all, aims for financial and systemic stability.
By contrast, microprudential policies are focused on individual stability (Caruana,
2010). According to Acharya and Thakor (2016, p. 4), because both forms of regula-
tion ultimately aim to improve the stability of the financial system, microprudential and
macroprudential regulation not only relate to each other, but there is, in fact, tension
between them. For more information on macroprudential policies and their differences
from microprudential policies, see for instance Galati and Moessner (2011).
It is important to highlight that the macroprudential regulation is crucial from a
financial stability and a systemic risk perspectives (Bruno et al., 2017; Cerutti et al.,
2017; de Haan et al., 2017; Karmakar, 2016). A broad stream of literature discusses
macroprudential regulation related not only to leverage but also to stress testing (Buncic
and Melecky, 2013), monetary transmission mechanisms (Agenor and da Silva, 2014),
credit spreads (Tayler and Zilberman, 2016), risk communication and visualization (Sarlin,
2016)
Thus, for the purpose of this present study, the study objects of the Business Cycle
(which has a strong connection to monetary policy), Systemic Risk, and Financial Stability
are linked to the macroprudential approach. By contrast, the study objects related to
the individual stability of institutions – Asymmetric Information, Moral Hazard (deposit
insurance), Bank Runs, Business Models, Capital Markets, and Credit Risk / Distress
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Risk / Default Risk – have a microprudential approach.
It should be noted that each article may have one or more objects of study and can
address both the macroprudential and microprudential object level. This classification
aims to facilitate the understanding of what types of risk the studies on the banking
leverage topic are dealing with, in accordance with Table 2.1 of the proposed coding
scheme.
Additionally, the articles may contain other objects of study not listed in Table 2.1
because the study seeks to list objects of studies related to regulatory banking leverage.
Thus, other objects of study connected to leverage are classified as Others.
Regarding the focus of the studies, also in Table 2.1 of the coding scheme, the expec-
tation from the results is that the Banks element be the main result found in the articles
surveyed, given that the prudential regulation of banking leverage – disclosed by the Basel
Committee – has this type of institution as the main focus.
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Classification and coding used for the analysis of the articles
Numeration Title Description
C1 Object of study microprudential
A - Asymmetric information
B - Moral hazard (deposit insurance)
C - Bank run
D - Business model
E - Capital market
F - Credit risk / Distress risk / Default risk
macroprudential
G - Business cycle
H - Systemic risk (contagion)
I - Financial stability
J - Others
C2 Focus
A - Financial institutions in general
B - Banks
C - Stock market
D - Insurance companies
E - Investment funds
F - Mortgage / real estate market
G - General market (non-financial)
H - Countries / government securities
I - Other segments
Table 2.1: Object and focus of the study.
With the codification proposed in Table 2.2, the idea was to understand how the
topic of leverage is being studied, that is, which type of study was done (theoretical or
empirical), which type of approach (quantitative or qualitative) and method were used,
and, if the study was empirical, what types of data were analysed (market, financial
statements, etc.), what was the scope and context of the articles, how many periods were
studied in the articles of the sample, and what types of results were found. It should be
noted that if the study used only simulated data or mathematical models, it is classified as
theoretical. In relation to the C6 classification (Data types analysed) of Table 2.2, there
is a difference in the option for the Various term compared to the Others term discussed
in Silva et al. (2017, p. 94) to facilitate the annotation scheme and due to the expectation
in this present work of the analysed articles using various data sources.
Additionally, in Table 2.2, the leverage metric used in the articles studied (classification
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C7) is discussed. Two leverage metrics are mentioned in this study. Metric A represents
the total assets of the banks over equity (or the inverse of this ratio) or the total debt over
total assets. In other words, the first metric is an indicator that demonstrates the equity
position. Metric B, which is the indicator promulgated by Basel III, comprises the ratio
between Tier 1 Capital and Total Exposure. This second metric basically represents an
indicator that comprises the quality equity of the banks over the total assets plus items
not accounted for in the assets, which are considered to be off-balance sheet items. This
indicator is presented in more detail in section 2.3.
Considering the characteristics of the leverage, the expectation regarding the evalua-
tion of this metric is that most of the articles are situated in item A, given that metric B
was promulgated by the Basel committee in 2013; therefore, only the studies conducted
most recently were suitable to perform at least one proxy of this new indicator.
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Classification and coding used for the analysis of the articles
Numeration Title Description
C3 Type of study A- Theoretical
B-Empirical
C- Both
C4 Type of approach A- Quantitative
B- Qualitative
C- Quantitative and qualitative
D- Review/Research
E- Not applicable
C5 Methods used A- Econometric / Statistical / Multivariate analysis
B- Computational / Simulation
C- Mathematical modelling
D- Not applicable
C6 Types of data analysed A- From the market
B- From balance sheets
C- Macroeconomic
D- From regulators, IMF, and other entities
E - Various
F- Not applicable
C7 Metrics for leverage A- Total assets / Net equity
B- Level 1 capital / Total exposure
C- Not applicable
C8 Scope A- One country
B- More than one country
C- Region/Block
D- Global
E- Not specified / Not applicable




C10 Periods studied A- Up to 2 years
B- From 2 to 5 years
C- From 5 to 10 years
D- More than 10 years
E- Not applicable
C11 Results A- New perspectives
B-
Consistent with studies previously
published in the literature
Table 2.2: Type of study, approach, methods used, type of data, metrics for leverage,
scope, context, period, and results.
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Regarding the Scope item, the objective was to answer the following questions: Where
is the focus of the articles? Does the study focus on a country or a region? Does the
article have a global scope? Considering the context, one can also see the focus countries
of the studies in Table 2.2 and whether they are developed or emerging or both. This
Table also codifies the period of time studied in the articles. For the articles that do not
use empirical data and, therefore, are only theoretical, the term Not applicable is adopted
for the period of time studied. In relation to the Results item found in the articles of the
sample (classification C11), two options were adopted in relation to the results analysed,
as follows: if they have new perspectives, taking into account the authors’ own mention;
or if the studies are consistent with previous publications.
Given the set of articles in the sample, it was found that the main publication vehicle
is the Journal of Banking and Finance, with 22 articles in the sample, representing 14%
of the total. The sample was also found to have a large dispersion of publication vehicles
- 40 journals had only 1 publication, which represents 25% of the total.
Figure 2.1: Number of articles per journal.
In relation to the year of publication, production increased after the financial crisis of
2007 - 86% of the sample’s articles were published within this period.
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1E,1I 2A 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10A 11A
Cabral
(2013).




1F,1I 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10C 11A
Lee and Lin
(2012).












1I,1J 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10C 11A
Valencia
(2014).




1I,1J 2A 3A 4A 5B,5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11B
Harding
et al. (2013).




1D,1H1I 2B 3A 4C 5D 6D 7C 8C 9A 10E 11B
Miele and
Sales (2011).
1I 2B 3A 4C 5D 6D 7C 8D 9C 10E 11B
Heed (2010). 1D,1H,1I 2A 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8B 9A 10E 11B
Continued in the next page.
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Artigo C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11
Bernard
et al. (2005).
1B 2B 3A 4A 5B,5C 6F 7C 8A 9A 10E 11A
Wang et al.
(2014).
1H 2A 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9B 10C 11A
Koch (2014). 1D,1E1G.1I 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10C 11A
Schmaltz
et al. (2014).
1D 2B 3B 4A 5B 6B 7B 8A 9A 10A 11A
Agur (2013). 1A,1I 2B 3A 4A 5C 6F 7C 8B 9A 10E 11A
Glasser
(2013).
1I 2A 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8A 9A 10E 11B
Mullineux
(2011).
1B,1I,1J 2B 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8A 9A 10E 11B
Handorf
(2011).




1F 2B 3A 4A 5B,5C 6E 7A 8A 9A 10 11B
Osborne
et al. (2017).
1G,1I 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A,7B 8A 9A 10D 11A
Arayssi
(2016).
1A,1D,1H,1J 2B 3A 4A 5C 6F 7A 8E 9D 10E 11A
Hasan et al.
(2016).
1B,1D,1F,1I 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8D 9C 10D 11A
Kuzubaş.
et al. (2016).
1D,1H 2B 3C 4A 5A,5B 6B 7A 8A 9A 10A 11A
Bengtsson
(2016).
1D,1G,1H 2E 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11A
Admati
(2016).
1F,1H,1I 2B 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11B
Benhabib
et al. (2016).




1F,1H,1I 2B 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8A 9A 10E 11B
Elyasiani
et al. (2015).
1E,1H,1I 2B,2D 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8B 9A 10C 11A
Fidrmuc
et al. (2015).
1D,1F 2A 3B 4A 5A 6B 7A 8A 9A 10B 11B
Dubecq et al.
(2015).
1A, 1J 2B 3A 4A 5C 6F 7C 8A 9A 10E 11A
Thimann
(2015).
1H 2B,2D 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8C 9A 10E 11B
Continued in the next page.
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Artigo C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11
Derviz
(2014).
1F,1H,1I 2B 3A 4A 5B,5C 6F 7C 8E 9E 10E 11A
Pakravan
(2014).
1H,1I 2B 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8A 9A 10E 11B
Borri et al.
(2014).
1H,1I 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10D 11B
Wilmarth
(2014).




1F,1J 2G 3A 4A 5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11A
Eberlein
et al. (2013).
1E,1G 2B 3B 4A 5A,5C 6A 7C 8A 9A 10D 11A
di Iasio
(2013).
1F,1G,1I 2B 3A 4A 5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11A
Jarrow
(2013).
1F,1G,1H,1I 2B 3A 4A 5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11B
Yang et al.
(2012).
1B,1E,1F 2D 3B 4A 5B,5C 6A 7C 8A 9B 10C 11B
Moosa
(2012).
1I,1J 2B 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8D 9C 10E 11B
Muradoglu
(2010).
1I,1J 2B 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8A 9A 10E 11A
Covi (2017). 1F,1I,1J 2B 3C 4C 5A 6A 7A,7B 8C 9A 10C 11B
Haritchabalet
et al. (2017).




1F,1G 2B 3C 4A 5A,5C 6E 7C 8E 9D 10D 11A
Sorokina
et al. (2017).
1D,1G 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10D 11A
Nesbitt
(2017).
1D,1F 2G 3B 4A 5A 6D 7C 8A 9A 10D 11B
Krstevska
et al. (2017).




1F,1G,1H,1I,1J 2B 3C 4A 5B,5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11A
Chen et al.
(2017).
1D,1J 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10D 11B
Entrop et al.
(2017).
1J 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10D 11A
Continued in the next page.
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Artigo C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11
Dandapani
et al. (2017).
1D,1I 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A,7B 8A 9A 10B 11A
Barucci et al.
(2016).
1F 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7B 8C 9A 10A 11B
Wu and
Zhao (2016).













1B,1E,1I 2B 3C 4A 5A,5B 6E 7A 8A 9A 10D 11A
Walther
(2016).





1F,1H,1I 2A 3B 4A 5B 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11B
Kanas
(2014).




1I 2B 3C 4A 5A,5C 6B 7B 8A 9A 10B 11A
Bergevin
et al. (2013).




1D,1I 2B 3B 4A 5B 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11B
Lee (2009a). 1J 2B 3B 4A 5A 6D 7A 8A 9B 10D 11B
Lee (2009b). 1B 2B 3B 4A 5A 6D 7A 8A 9B 10D 11B
Gavalas
(2015).
1I,1J 2B 3B 4A 5A 6A 7A 8C 9A 10C 11B
Paris (2000). 1E 2B 3A 4A 5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11A
Chaigneau
(2013).
1J 2B 3A 4A 5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11B
Imbierowicz
et al. (2018).
1G,1H 2B 3B 4A 5A 6D 7A,7B 8A 9A 10C 11B
Continued in the next page.
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1D,1I,1J 2B 3B 4A 5A 6D 7A 8A 9B 10D 11B
Hossain
et al. (2017).
1G,1I 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A,7B 8C 9B 10C 11A
Kim et al.
(2018).
1F,1I 2A 3B 4A 5A 6E 7C 8A 9A 10B 11B
Allahrakha
et al. (2018).








1D,1F,1H 2B 3A 4A 5B,5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11B
Dreassi et al.
(2017).




















1J 2G 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10B 11B
Herring
(2018).
1J 2B 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8A 9A 10E 11B
Roukny
et al. (2016).
1F.1H 2B 3A 4A 5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11A
Holland
(2010).
1D,1I,1J 2B 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8A 9A 10E 11A
Goddard
et al. (2009).
1I 2B 3A 4B 5D 6F 7C 8C 9A 10A 11B
Greenwood
et al. (2017).
1I 2B 3C 4C 5C 6D 7B 8A 9A 10E 11A
Continued in the next page.
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1E,1I 2B 3C 4C 5A 6A 7A 8B 9C 10D 11B
Morris and
Shin (2008).




1B 2B 3B 4A 5A 6B 7A 8A 9A 10C 11A
Baker
(2016).




1J 2B 3A 4A 5B, 5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11A
Gong et al.
(2018).
1D 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10D 11A
Dewenter
et al. (2018).
1B 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8B 9A 10C 11B
Chami et al.
(2018).
1B, 1I 2B 3C 4C 5A 6E 7A,7B 8A 9A 10A 11B
Barucci et al.
(2018).
1H 2B 3B 4A 5A 6D 7B 8C 9A 10A 11B
Milonas
(2018).
1J 2B 3B 4A 5A 6E 7A 8A 9A 10D 11B
Bharati and
Jia (2018).








1H, 1J 2B 3A 4A 5B,5C 6F 7C 8E 9D 10E 11A
Table 2.3: Articles in the sample.
The results found in relation to the components of each table presented in the method-
ology and respective coding are shown in what follows below. Considering the coding
scheme proposed in Table 2.1, which addresses the object of study and focus, we can see
from Table 2.4 that, considering only the microprudential approach, the Credit Risk /
Distress Risk /Default Risk object was the object most encountered (48 articles or 30%
of the sample). Given that the credit risk to which banks are subjected represents the
greatest risk incurred by them, this result is somewhat expected, in accordance with the
works of Poghosyan and Čihak (2011), Episcopos (2008), and DeAngelo and Stulz (2015),
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who discussed the quality of the assets, regulatory limits, and debt issuance, respectively,
as well as possible impacts on the credit risk of banking institutions.
Additionally, from the microprudential point of view, 22 articles in total were classified
within the Moral Hazard object of study. For example, moral hazard with credit risk and
also corporate governance were discussed in the works of Allen et al. (1996); Episcopos
(2008); Harding et al. (2013); Inderst and Mueller (2008), and Mullineux (2011, 2014). The
Business Model object of study is more strongly associated either with a macroprudential
object of approach (Systemic Risk, 11 times), in works such as Blum (2008); Vallascas
and Keasey (2012), or with a microprudential object (Credit Risk, 9 times), in works such
as Aymanns et al. (2016); Tasca et al. (2014).
Considering the Capital Market object of study, which was found in 17 articles, it was
associated with Financial Stability in 10 of the sample articles, in works such as Calomiris
and Nissim (2014); Chan-Lau et al. (2015); Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013), which assessed
the behaviour of the stock value of the financial institutions before and during the last
major financial depression.
Seven of the nine articles of Asymmetric Information object was found in the period
after 2007 crisis, in works such as Dermine (2015); Plantin (2015), who studied imperfect
information regarding banks’ assets. It was also verified that only three articles had Bank
Run as the object of study (Angeloni and Faia, 2013; Benhabib et al., 2016; Dermine,
2015), which can be regarded as an opportunity for future studies, given that the bank
run - according to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) - is a common feature during a crisis.
The Financial Stability object of study was found to have the highest number of
articles when considering only the macroprudential approach - 73 or 46% of the sample.
This object is predominant in articles appearing after the financial crisis of 2007. It is
interesting to note that in a joint analysis with other objects, the Financial Stability
object was found in 24 articles in conjunction with the Systemic Risk object and in 21
articles in conjunction with the Credit Risk object - see Table 2.4. It can be said that this
relationship is important, given that after the financial crisis of 2007, the concern with
financial stability was discussed, mainly due to the contagion and consequent spread of
systemic risk among large international banks, for example, in the studies of Beltratti and
Stulz (2012) and López-Espinosa et al. (2012), which indicated that long-term debt deficits
are a determining factor for the spread of systemic risk and the consequent fragile financial
stability of large world banks. Furthermore, the discussion of financial stability with credit
risk was addressed in the studies of Vazquez and Federico (2015) and Chernykh and Cole
(2015), which dealt with the connection between default risk and financial stability.
Also from the macroprudential view, the Business Cycle object of study was found
a higher number of times with the objects of study Financial Stability (15 times) and
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Systemic Risk (11 times), which indicates the strong connection of the objects of study of
this same approach. Except for the study of Saunders and Wilson (2001), for the other
articles in the sample, the Business Cycle object of study became the target of study
after the financial crisis of 2007, which indicates the concern of experts about placing the




























Bank run 1 1 3
Business
model
3 4 0 34
Capital
market
0 2 0 2 17
Credit risk 1 6 1 9 2 48
Business
cycle
0 1 2 5 3 7 25
Systemic
risk
3 1 0 11 2 18 11 44
Financ.
stab.
1 6 1 8 10 21 15 24 73
Others 5 6 1 7 0 11 3 13 17 48
Table 2.4: Connection of the objects of study.
The objects of study classified in the Others item - not directly explained in Table 2.1
- and their respective number of citations were as follows: Corporate Governance (twelve
times); Liquidity (eleven times); Monetary Policy (eight times);, Agency Theory (seven
times); Market Discipline and Monitoring or Supervision (six times each); Market Risk
(four times); Banking Resolution and Trade-off Theory (twice each); and Regulation,
Economic Policy, Safety Nets, and Behavioural Economics (once each). The object most
cited in the Others category - Corporate Governance - was in line with the procedures
promulgated by the Basel committee for good supervisory and regulatory practices, known
as pillars two and three.
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Also in relation to the results from Table 2.1 of the proposed coding scheme, with
regard to the study’s focus, most of the articles in the sample have Banks as the study’s
focus (125 of the 160 articles in the sample). Given that regulatory banking leverage has
the banks as its main object, the result found was expected.
Regarding Table 2.2 of the proposed classification scheme, which addresses how bank-
ing leverage is being studied, the results of which are shown in Table 2.5 and Figures 2.2,
2.3, and 2.4, the categories of Theoretical and Empirical study types had 44% and 48% of
the articles from the sample, respectively. The remainder (8%) used these categories to-
gether. Regarding the type of approach, 78% (125 articles) used a quantitative approach,
with the following fitting into this category: empirical studies (coding C3-B and C3-C,
representing 48% and 8% of the sample, respectively), theorists of mathematical meth-
ods (coding C5-C, representing 14%), and theorists of simulation methods (coding C5-B,
representing 9%). Therefore, there is a possibility for future studies with a qualitative
approach, as this approach represented only 16% (25 articles) of the sample. Regarding
the methods used, 48% were of the Econometric / Statistical / Multivariate analysis type.
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Classification Number of articles Proportion
C3 - A - Theoretical 70 44%
C3 - B - Empirical 76 48%
C3 - C - Both 14 9%
C5 - A - Econometric / Statistical 77 48%
C5 - B - Computational / Simulation 15 9%
C5 - C - Mathematical modelling 22 14%
C5 - D - Not applicable 26 16%
C5 - A e B 2 1%
C5 - A e C 5 3%
C5 - B e C 13 8%
C7 - A - Total assets/ Equity 73 46%
C7 - B - Tier 1 capital / Total exposure 13 8%
C7 - A e B 10 6%
C7 - C - Not applicable 64 40%
C8 - A - One country 75 47%
C8 - B - More than one country 13 8%
C8 - C - Region / bloc 17 11%
C8 - D - Global 8 5%
C8 - E - Not specified / Not applicable 47 29%
C10 - A - Up to 2 years 11 7%
C10 - B - From 2 to 5 years 13 8%
C10 - C - From 5 to 10 years 23 14%
C10 - D - More than 10 years 39 24%
C10 - E - Not applicable 74 46%
C11 - A - New perspectives 69 43%
C11 - B - Consistent with previous studies 91 57%
Table 2.5: Number of articles in accordance with the classification.
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Figure 2.2: Type of approach.
Also in relation to Table 2.2 of the coding scheme, most of the analysed data are from
various sources (36%, 58 articles), as seen in Figure 2.3. This result is feasible since,
in empirical studies of financial system analysis, it is more likely that data are collected
from various sources than just one location. When only one data source was used, market,
balance sheet, and regulator data were chosen in the sample of articles. In relation to
the results for the metrics used, according to Table 2.5, 46% of the articles in the sample
used the traditional accounting metric (C7-A), which considers the assets and equity of
the institutions, or variants very close to this metric. This result was expected because
the regulatory leverage metric stipulated by the Basel committee was disclosed only in
the year 2014.
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Figure 2.3: Type of data.
The results associated with Table 2.2 of the coding scheme indicated a gap for studies
that involve emerging countries and address the topic of leverage - see Figure 2.4. Only 9
articles (6% of the sample) have emerging countries as the context - 92 studies (58% of the
sample) performed were related to developed countries. In relation to the scope applied,
according to Table 2.5, 47% of the studies apply to only one country - for example, the
studies addressing the financial crisis that began in 2007 and related to the behaviour
of American banks (Cathcart et al., 2015; Papanikolaou and Wolff, 2014) and Canadian
banks Guidara et al. (2013).
Figure 2.4: Context.
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Regarding the C10-D coding from Table 2.5, the empirical articles with study periods
longer than 10 years have the highest proportion in the sample, representing 24% of
the total number of articles researched, which indicates a trend of longer-term empirical
studies when addressing the topic of banking leverage. Studies with a macroprudential
approach are predominant when a longer period of time is considered, for example, the
studies by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014), Poghosyan and Čihak (2011), Guidara et al.
(2013), Weiß et al. (2014), Kishan and Opiela (2012), Calomiris and Nissim (2014), Black
et al. (2016), and Calmès and Théoret (2013).
Regarding the Results item of the coding scheme in Table 2.5, it was found that 57%
of the articles surveyed are consistent with results previously presented in the literature
(C11-A) and approximately 43% present new perspectives in relation to previous results
in the literature (C11-B), which shows that the subject of banking leverage provides a
significant share of new approaches and an addition to existing theory. For example, the
study by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) paid particular attention to the deleveraging
process of banking institutions after the 2007 crisis, and the study of Dermine (2015)
revealed new ideas by studying the leverage limit as an argument to reduce the risk of
bank runs, given the asymmetric information about the values of bank assets.
2.1 Meta-analysis and network analysis
According to Wolf (1986, p. 10), the procedures used in data meta-analysis enable quan-
titative reviews and standardized summaries of academic research, which aim to establish
guidelines for reliable and valid reviews.
Citation analysis has become an important indicator for assessing the impact of schol-
arly works (Garfield, 1983, p. 355). From bibliometric analysis, one can identify the most
influential articles on a topic and obtain the links between articles that explore a certain
topic.
The results of bibliometric analysis are useful not only to measure the popularity and
influence of articles but also to identify key authors and their publications. According to
van Raan (2003, p. 20-21), bibliometric analysis is based on the premise that authors pub-
lish their most important results in cutting-edge journals, and the application of citation
analysis is, in many situations, a strong indicator of scientific performance.
Among the various types of bibliometric analysis, the study of networks is an important
method for extracting relevant information about a particular topic. There are various
forms of network evaluation involving different objects of study discussed in the literature
on a particular topic. For Small (1973, p. 265), co-citation analysis and the identification
of clusters of co-cited papers highlight a new way of studying specialties in science. Morris
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et al. (2003, p. 413) established that the analysis of research fronts is done based on a
large number of articles that reference fundamental articles, regardless of the time of the
research.
The concept of network analysis has received attention lately due to the development
of new forms of scientific collaboration provided by recent technological innovation. For
the elaboration of network analysis, Zupic and Čater (2015, p. 436) proposed a flow of
intellectual mapping composed of five stages, as follows: elaboration of the study, data
collection, data analysis, data visualization, and interpretation.
In the Elaboration of the Study stage, the research question and the bibliometric meth-
ods to answer the proposed question are defined. According to Zupic and Čater (2015, p.
440), one of the main decisions made in scientific mapping is to limit the study scope. In
an attempt to address this issue, the authors suggested the two following options: care-
fully selecting the keywords searched and limiting the scope to articles published in one
or a small number of journals.
According to Aria and Cuccurullo (2017, p. 960), Data Collection is divided into three
sub-stages. The first sub-stage involves obtaining the data. There are various online bib-
liographic databases, such as Web of Science, Scopus, Google Scholar, and Science Direct;
however, they do not cover scientific fields and journals in the same way. Thus, each
researcher must identify the most suitable database for their research. According toAria
and Cuccurullo (2017, p. 961), the second sub-stage involves loading and converting the
data into a format that is friendly to the bibliometric tools being used. The final sub-stage
is data cleaning, in which the quality of the results depends on the quality of the data.
Various reprocessing methods can be used, for example, detection of duplicate elements
and misspellings. According to the authors, although most databases are reliable, cited
references may contain multiple versions of the same publication and different spellings
of an author’s name. Additionally, cited journals may appear in many different ways and
books may have different editions.
The Data Analysis phase begins with pre-processing, in which, to achieve better re-
sults, the data must be clean (Zupic and Čater, 2015, p. 442). This phase encompasses
the descriptive analysis and identification of networks. According to Aria and Cuccurullo
(2017), different approaches have been developed to identify networks using different units








Common references in the au-
thors’ works
Document
Common references in the docu-
ments
Journal
Common references in the papers
of the journals




Co-occurrence of authors in the
author’s list of a document
Country per affiliation
Co-occurrence of countries in the
address list of a document
Institution per affiliation
Co-occurrence of institutions in
the address list of a document
Co-word
Keyword, or term ex-
tracted from the title, ab-
stract, or body of the doc-
ument
Co-occurrence of terms in a doc-
ument
Source: Aria and Cuccurullo (2017)
Table 2.6: Usual bibliometric techniques according to the unit of analysis.
According to Aria and Cuccurullo (2017, p. 961), the most common form of data anal-
ysis is citation analysis, which uses citation counting as a measure of similarity between
documents, authors, and journals. Citation analysis can be divided into bibliographic
coupling and co-citation. Bibliographic coupling was proposed by Kessler (1963), who
verified that the greater the similarity between the content of the articles studied, the
greater the similarity of the reference literature, which can be obtained by the general
formula, as follows:
Bcoup = AAt (2.1)
in which A is a document x cited reference matrix. Each element bij indicates how
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many bibliographic couplings exist between documents i and j. The intensity of the
bibliographic coupling between two articles i and j is defined simply by the number of
references that the articles have in common.
The co-citation technique - proposed by Small (1973) – aims to analyse the basic arti-
cles and pioneers in a specific field of scientific research. According to Aria and Cuccurullo
(2017, p. 961), bibliographic coupling is based on the documents searched and is used to
map current research fronts. A co-citation study analyses the documents cited through
the documents searched. According to the authors, a co-citation between two articles
occurs when both are cited in a third article. A co-citation network can be obtained by
general formula 2.1; however, in this case, element Bij indicates how many co-citations
exist between documents i and j.
According to Zupic and Čater (2015, p. 446), another taxonomy of the bibliometric
technique, i.e., the co-author analysis, is used to identify the structure of scientific net-
works established in the collaborations of authors and their affiliations. In turn, co-word
analysis is based on the most important words in the documents. According to Aria and
Cuccurullo (2017, p. 961), co-word analysis facilitates the understanding of the cognitive
structure by mapping and creating clusters of the terms extracted from the keywords,
titles, or abstracts. A co-word network can be obtained by the general formula described
in Equation 2.1, in which A is a document x word matrix.
According to Aria and Cuccurullo (2017, p. 961), once data analysis is constructed
and the network of connections is established, a normalization process (e.g., Jaccard
coefficient or Pearson correlation) can be performed. Additionally, the use of a data
reduction technique is appropriate for identifying niches, such as the use of clustering
algorithms.
For Zupic and Čater (2015, p. 446), the Data Visualization phase is the first stage
of mapping a scientific field. According to the authors, network analysis results in visu-
alizations of scientific fields in which the nodes show the units of analysis (documents,
authors, etc.) and the ties signify the similarity between the connections.
Finally, the Interpretation of the Data - the last stage of the flow of intellectual map-
ping proposed by Zupic and Čater (2015) – has as a premise the need for the author to
expand upon the theme to better interpret the results.
Thus, in this present study, the data collection for the network analysis followed the
proposition via the Scopus database with 160 articles in the final sample.
For the data analysis in this article, two taxonomies of bibliometric techniques were
used. The first is the co-citation by author taxonomy, which has the objective of analysing
the basic articles on the topic of banking leverage, in accordance with Small (1973).
Zamore et al. (2018) used the co-citation technique for bibliographic review and credit
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risk agenda. Second, the co-word by keyword taxonomy was used to understand the
cognitive structure of leverage, in accordance with Aria and Cuccurullo (2017, p. 961).
The Bibliometrix package of the R software - developed by Aria and Cuccurullo (2017) and
which supports a bibliometric analysis process compatible with that proposed by Zupic
and Čater (2015) - was used as an automated tool for the analysis. Thus, the knowledge
base as well as possible inflections in the field of scientific research were explored. In
the case of banking leverage, these estimates are important for evaluating the intellectual
structure of the literature on the topic.
For visualization and interpretation of the results found, the VosViewer software -
which is useful for graphically constructing bibliometric maps - was used van Eck and
Waltman (2010). It uses the Visualization of Similarities (VOS) mapping technique to
generate views based on the distances from bibliometric networks. For the formation of
clusters in the VosViewer program, the Pajek package was used (Mrvar and Batagelj,
2016).
Aiming to reinforce the results presented above from the bibliometric review, the tech-
nique of analysis through co-citation networks was also used for the 160 articles of the
sample. For the analysis of co-citations, the main 60 references cited were selected to per-
form a content analysis of these articles. References related to the normative publications
of regulatory agencies were excluded to restrict the sample to only include articles.
According to Small (2004), this technique measures the frequency with which two
articles are cited simultaneously in a third article. The networks are represented by
circles, in which each item represents an author, and the size is linked to the number
of times the article participated in a co-citation, which demonstrates the strength of the
links or the connectivity of the author. The lines represent the co-citations themselves.
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Figure 2.5: Co-citation Network.
Figure 2.5 is the result of the co-citation network of the articles used in the bibliometric
review, and the creation of the five main clusters can be seen in it. The purple cluster
includes the works of Blum (1999); Calem and Rob (1999); Jarrow (2013); Shrieves and
Dahl (1992), who addressed the link between risk and banking capital.
In the yellow cluster, the works of Adrian and Shin (2010); Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) are the ones with the greatest link strength (above 20)
- they dealt with credit cycles, liquidity and the relationship with leverage. In the blue
cluster, the authors Brunnermeier (2009); Demsetz and Strahan (1997); DeYoung and
Roland (2001); Diamond (1984); Wagner (2010) also had link strengths above 20, and
they addressed the theory of financial intermediation, more specifically, the monitoring
and business model of banking institutions, with the risk incurred by these institutions.
The most recent publications in this cluster also address liquidity, credit bubbles, and
systemic risk.
The green cluster includes the authors Allen and Gale (2000); Calomiris and Kahn
(1991); Keeley (1990), who had the greatest link strength (also above 20) and essentially
addressed moral hazard, default risk, and contagion in the financial system. The red
cluster has as its exponent the study of Gropp and Heider (2010), which analysed the
determinants of the banking capital structure, considering elements of the classical theory
of finance in the activity of financial intermediation. Thus, by analysing the network of
co-citations and the construction of clusters, it can be seen that the theoretical framework
used in the bibliometric revision uses more recent citations regarding the financial crisis
of 2007, as well as classic financial theory.
32
Figure 2.6: Co-word Network.
For the co-word analysis, using the keywords mentioned by the authors in the Scopus
database, 40 main keyword connections were selected in the sample of articles.
Through the clusters formed, it could be seen that the keywords bank, capital, regula-
tion, and Basel, and their variations, permeate the six clusters found, which was expected
because they are basic words for the study of leverage, and, according to Galati and
Moessner (2011), the main target of the Basel 3 proposals was the banking sector. Thus,
the finding of these key terms in the articles of the sample is consistent with the concerns
of the banking sector’s regulating agencies.
In addition to these key terms, the most found words and their corresponding number
of links are as follows: systemic risk (14), financial crisis (13), and liquidity (10).
In the red cluster, the evaluation of leverage in the macroprudential context is high-
lighted, which is associated with the systemic risk and credit risk objects of study. This
association can be found in the studies by Vallascas and Keasey (2012) and Patro et al.
(2013). This cluster shows the concern of the articles studied regarding the financial
policies adopted by countries and regulatory bodies , which is the focus of the Basel 3
accord (BIS, 2010). In the green cluster, the regulation of capital structure and risk is
represented by the study of objects related to moral hazard, deposit insurance, and cor-
porate governance in studies such as those by Mullineux (2011, 2014). In the blue cluster,
keywords that represent variations of the term banking are found, which are associated
with capital structure and banking regulation (Basel) and also the terms diversification
and liquidity. The studies of Allahrakha et al. (2018); Chen and Skoglund. (2014) are
examples of articles in this cluster that are in line with the concerns of the regulatory
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agencies about the ability of financial institutions to honour their deposits and funding,
both in the short and long term, as advocated by BIS (2010).
In relation to the yellow cluster, the financial crisis and the corresponding capital
requirements - including the Leverage Ratio - are associated with the contagion and
market discipline objects of study in studies such as those by Acharya and Thakor (2016);
Poghosyan and Čihak (2011). These works support the notion that both depositors and
market participants play an important role in financial stability. In the purple cluster,
the Basel accords and capital regulation are associated with the activity of financial
intermediation and financial stability, in accordance with the study of Cabral (2013).
Finally, the light blue cluster covers the keywords Basel II and private equity, which can
be seen in the work of Arayssi (2016), which addresses the effect that private investment
has on bank capital requirements.
2.2 Brief report on prudential banking regulation and
leverage
Capital limits were originally dealt with in the first Basel Accord, Basel I, released in
1988. A new capital accord, known as Basel II, was published in 2004. A broad stream
of literature on the the first Basel accords, taking into account financial stability, banking
policy and impacts on the industry and economy, is extensively discussed (Andersen, 2011;
Ayadi et al., 2016; Aymanns et al., 2016; Barakova and Palvia, 2014; Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache, 2011; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011; Herring, 2004; Rossignolo et al., 2012;
Schmaltz et al., 2014). For more information on the Basel I and Basel II, Balin (2008)
performed a descriptive analysis of both accords.
With the advent of the subprime market crisis in 2007, the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) and the G20 proposed a set of measures aimed at protecting the banking system
against financial crises. These negotiations contributed greatly to the broader reform that
culminated in the most recent capital accord named Basel III BIS (2010), which involves
greater concern for the quality of the banks’ capital, among other measures. In this new
context, where liquidity plays a major role in financial crisis, various studies discusses
different facets of Basel III (Dermine, 2015; Fidrmuc and Lind, 2018; Hessou and Lai,
2017; Hong et al., 2014; King, 2013; Petrella and Resti, 2017; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego,
2016). Herring (2018) discusses the growing complexity in financial regulation, including
an analysis of Basel III.
Most countries have gone through a process of disintermediation, that is, a large part
of financial intermediation is taking the form of negotiable securities, rather than loans
and bank deposits (Hausler, 2002). Due to regulatory incentives and capital requirements,
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as well as the possibility of greater returns to shareholders and greater competitiveness,
banks have moved financial risks, especially credit risk, from their balance sheets into the
securities market. According Dubecq et al. (2015, p. 72), intermediaries use off-balance
sheet conduits to adjust the level of capital. Those movements are related to shadow
banking procedures (Pozsar et al., 2010).
One of the topics in this new accord relates to the excessive leverage of financial
institutions. According to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013), many banks were apparently in
compliance with the minimum regulatory capital both before and after the crisis; however,
they did not actually have enough capital to absorb the unexpected losses.
Thus, the Basel III recommendations require that the Leverage Ratio and risk-based
capital requirements function together (Brei and Gambacorta, 2016, p. 360). According
to the authors, on the one hand, it is important to have risk-sensitive capital requirements
because the charges for capital are higher for exposure to low probability of payment, and
lower when the probability of payment of an asset is higher.
On the other hand, given that any estimate of the probability of loss depends on
the assumptions of the underlying model, which may be wrong and lead to the sub-
estimation of the associated risks, it is important to have a Leverage Ratio restriction
that is independent of such risk assessments (Miele and Sales, 2011, p.293).
In particular, risk-based capital requirements refer to the banking institutions’ poten-
tial loss, while the Leverage Ratio indicates the maximum loss that can be covered by the
capital (Brei and Gambacorta, 2016, p. 360).
For this reason, BIS (2010) recommended the establishment of new operational limits
to be followed by financial institutions, which meant additional requirements for global
banks. BIS (2014) officialised the introduction of the new Leverage Ratio (LR) indicator.
2.3 Measuring regulatory banking leverage
BIS (2014) established a supplementary instrument to the capital requirements based
on risk weighting by adopting a leverage cap in conjunction with the recently revised
operational capital limits in BIS (2010). According to the agency, the LR leads to greater
resilience for the banks and the financial system because such a restriction acts as a second
layer of protection against possible errors in the measurement of the risks of financial
intermediation operations. Additionally, imposing limits on banks’ leveraging can reduce
possible excess credit supply, thus reducing potential cyclical effects on the banks’ capital
requirements. The guideline of the said agency is that the leverage measure adopted by
the national jurisdictions be simple, transparent, and easy to determine.
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According to Gabbi et al. (2015, p. 118), one of the impacts of this new approach
is that it broadens the definition of what constitutes leverage of a banking institution.
Thus, it should lead to banks acting noticeably to increase their capital or to reduce their
intermediation activity.
The Leverage Ratio (LR) is defined as the fraction of Tier 1 and Total Exposure, where
Tier 1 corresponds to the sum of the Core Capital and the Additional Tier 1 Capital, whose
portions are explicitly defined in the BIS (2010) document. In turn, according to BIS
(2014), Total Exposure means the exposures recorded in the balance sheet added to the
following items with specific treatment: exposure to derivatives, exposure to transferable
securities, and items not recorded on the balance sheet.
2.4 Connection of regulatory banking leverage with
objects of study from the literature on finance
and economics
Main object of associated study Examples of important studies
Moral hazard Gjerde and Semmen (1995).
Gueyie and Lai (2003).
Blum (2008).
Asymmetric information Morgan (2002).
Blum (2008).
Bank run Angeloni and Faia (2013).
Business model Carey et al. (1998).
Holland (2010).
Kane (2012).
Vallascas and Keasey (2012).
Credit risk Blum (2008).
Episcopos (2008).
Poghosyan and Čihak (2011).
Vallascas and Keasey (2012).
Lee and Chih (2013).
Patro et al. (2013).
Vazquez and Federico (2015).
Business cycle Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012).
Angeloni and Faia (2013).
Guidara et al. (2013).
Continued on the next page.
36
Main object of associated study Examples of important studies
Poledna et al. (2014).
Capital market Saunders and Wilson (2001).
Evanoff and Wall (2001).
Beltratti and Stulz (2012).
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013).
Calomiris and Nissim (2014).
Systemic risk López-Espinosa et al. (2012).
Vallascas and Keasey (2012).
Patro et al. (2013).
Weiß et al. (2014).
Black et al. (2016).
Financial stability Morris and Shin (2008).




Patro et al. (2013).
Vazquez and Federico (2015).
Others Hughes et al. (1999).
McAleer (2009).
John et al. (2010).
Clarke (2010).
Braun and Raddatz (2010).
Holland (2010).
Kane (2012).
Kishan and Opiela (2012).
Angeloni and Faia (2013).
Riccetti et al. (2013).
DeAngelo and Stulz (2015).
Table 2.7: Objects of study table.
Table 2.7 shows the studies described in this section, with more than 15 citations on the
date of the last study done in the sample, contemplating the objects of studies associated
with banking leverage.
The association between asymmetric information, moral hazard, and capital
ratios that limit the banks’ leverage was done in important studies in the 1990s and
2000s, before the financial crisis of 2007.
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Gjerde and Semmen (1995) analysed the effectiveness of risk-based capital indicators
when bank deposits are fully insured, and the results showed that, when diverted from the
optimal weightings of risk, a combination of leverage restriction and a risk-based capital
indicator appears to be a more suitable approach.
In the case of official deposit insurance in Canada, Gueyie and Lai (2003, p. 249) found
no evidence of moral hazard in the banking industry after the introduction of deposit
insurance in this country. The authors found that the total capital risk, market risk,
and implied volatility of bank assets increased. However, these conditions are necessary,
but not sufficient, to complete the change in behaviour of banks in the midst of the
implementation of deposit insurance.
Blum (2008, p. 1700) found that without capital regulation, banks have an incentive
to inefficiently incur high risks, both in the presence of deposit insurance not properly
priced and in externalities that result in banking collapses. However, as risk is not di-
rectly observable, due to privacy and unobservable information from the banks, capital
requirements cannot precisely control the level of risk to which banks are exposed.
Morgan (2002, p. 874) associated asymmetric information in relation to the opacity
about the information available from the banks, indicating the disagreement in certain
evaluations of the American rating agencies and emphasizing that the uncertainty about
the banks comes from their assets, loans, and securities in particular, which are risks that
are difficult to observe and change. In addition to the uncertainty about their assets, the
leverage of the banks can also result in problems of agency.
Regarding bank runs, Angeloni and Faia (2013) constructed a macroeconomic model
to study the transmission of monetary policy and the relationship with capital, and they
indicated that risk-based capital indicators are bad for financial well-being.
Regarding the Business model object of study and its relationship with leverage, Carey
et al. (1998) highlighted the specialization in the North American corporate credit market
by comparing corporate lending by banks and other financial institutions. The results
showed that financial institutions tend to lend to riskier companies, particularly those
that are more leveraged.
Holland (2010) reviewed the literature on business models and compared the cases of
bankrupt and non-bankrupt banks and found evidence that the lack of basic knowledge
about the risks and values of the banking business by managers and the administration
of the institutions in the failed banks had an effect on the recent banking crisis.
Kane (2012) studied the tax benefits received by financial institutions in the safety
net contracts in the United States and concluded that a key factor in achieving robust
financial reform is to develop an effective statistical metric for measuring the ex-ante value
of the support given, both in aggregate form and by individual institution.
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Increased risk-taking by banks can lead to financial problems for these institutions - the
so-called financial distress - or even to banking collapse. Without a capital requirement
appropriately chosen by the regulation, banks can increase risk-taking and also increase
the likelihood of collapse (Blum, 2008, p. 1700).
To encourage banks to reliably report their risks, Blum (2008, p. 1700) proposed a
banking leverage model that combines two types of situations, as follows: banks’ risks are
ex ante private information, but the regulator can discover the risk incurred ex post. An
optimal combination of capital requirements is, therefore, formed by the following two
bits of information: the information made available by the banks and the information
measured by a leverage constraint independent of the risk assessment.
Additionally, in the context of the likelihood of a banking collapse, the relationship of
this issue and prudential regulation of capital was seen in the work of Episcopos (2008).
The author used barrier options to study contingency claims. According to the author,
barrier options are similar to the standardized options for buying and selling stocks;
however, they start or stop when the value of the underlying asset reaches a predetermined
level before the date for exercising the option. The regulator or the administrator of
the bank deposit insurance has an option over the assets of the banks, which can be
counterbalanced with the expectation of coverage costs (Episcopos, 2008, p. 1677). The
results found showed that regulatory barriers are priced into the stock market and are
inversely proportional to the leverage indicator.
Poghosyan and Čihak (2011, p. 163) analysed the determinants of problematic banking
situations in Europe, and the results showed that leverage is an important determinant of
the risk situations of banks as well as the asset quality and profitability profile. Addition-
ally, Lee and Chih (2013) examine whether Chinese banks have met standard regulations
and analysis how previous regulations have impacted bank risk.
To reduce the possibility of a banking collapse, Vallascas and Keasey (2012) suggest the
adoption of a ceiling in the absolute size of a bank, which would be an effective measure and
complement the measures of liquidity and leverage. The authors also suggested adopting
portions of non-interest revenue (service revenue) and the growth of assets, which are
important indicators in regulatory actions disclosed by the Basel Committee.
Vazquez and Federico (2015, p. 1) analyze the evolution of banks’ financing structures
in the course of the global financial crisis, as well as the implications for financial stability.
According to the authors, the emphasis of Basel III should be on the leverage of the banks,
particularly for systematically important institutions.
It should be noted that, besides the determinants of the performance profile of the
banks already cited (e.g., profitability, quality, size, and growth of assets), institutions are
affected by the economic context they are subjected to – these external determinants are
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analysed in important studies related to the leverage of banking institutions.
In a study conducted with data before and after the 2007 crisis, Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
(2012) found evidence of the pro-cyclicity of leverage for large commercial banks and
investment banks in the United States. The study also covered emerging market countries,
and the results showed that tighter banking regulations may have contributed to less
deleveraging during the crisis of 2007. According to these authors, excessive risk-taking
before the crisis was related to the quality, not quantity, of the assets.
Angeloni and Faia (2013, p. 311) studied the connection between monetary policy
and capital regulation, and the results showed that a monetary expansion and a positive
productivity shock increase the risk and leverage of the banks. According to the authors,
risk-based capital requirements amplify the economic cycle. Thus, within simple pru-
dential rules, the best combination includes anti-cyclical capital ratios and a response to
monetary policy for asset prices or for leveraging of the banks.
Guidara et al. (2013, p. 3374) found countercyclical effects between the capital buffer
of six large Canadian banks and the business cycle, with a larger capital buffer in economic
expansions than in recessions, which can be explained – among others results – by the
Canadian experience of implementing both the risk-based capital requirement and the
non-risk-based capital requirement (Leverage Ratio).
Poledna et al. (2014) considered the leverage cycle to be a process that is dependent on
investor heterogeneity. The authors used three regulatory credit policies, as follows: the
case of non-regulation, the Basel II accord, and a hypothetical alternative using options
to hedge risk operations. When compared to the unregulated case, both the Basel II
accord and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when the leverage is low,
but increase the risk when the leverage is high. This is because both regulatory policies
increase the level of buying and selling of assets necessary to achieve deleveraging, which
may destabilize the market (Poledna et al., 2014, p. 199).
The relationship between capital markets and leverage was considered in important
studies conducted by Beltratti and Stulz (2012); Calomiris and Nissim (2014); Demirguc-
Kunt et al. (2013); Evanoff and Wall (2001); Saunders and Wilson (2001), which compared
the behaviour of instruments issued by banks (stocks or subordinated debt) and the level
of capital held by these institutions, especially in crisis situations.
Saunders and Wilson (2001, p. 185) mention self-regulatory incentives generated by
valuable bank charters to constrain their risk taking and presents evidence that char-
ter value itself may emerge from high-risk intermediation. During economic expansions,
bank charter values rise to reflect growth opportunities and banks gain easier access to
equity capital sources. However, the relationship may invert during economic contrac-
tions, demonstrating that the charter value and bank leverage relationship is sensitive to
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market conditions.
Evanoff and Wall (2001, p. 121) performed an empirical analysis of the effectiveness
of some capital ratios as well as subordinated debt spreads to predict the economic con-
ditions of banks. The results showed that some capital ratios have no predictive power.
However, the leverage ratio performs much like the sound predictive power of the spreads
of subordinated debts.
Beltratti and Stulz (2012, p. 1) used the significant variations in the share returns of
major world banks during the period from July 2007 to December 2008 to evaluate the
poor performance of these banks’ shares during this period. Among other results, they
found that the banks with better performance had lower leverage and lower returns just
before the crisis.
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013, p. 1147) studied the situations in which the best cap-
italized banks obtained higher stock returns during the financial crisis. The authors
distinguished various types of capital ratios, as follows: risk-based capital ratio, leverage
indicator, level 1 and level 2 capital ratios, and the tangible capital ratio. Among the
results found, before the crisis, the difference between capital ratios did not have much
impact on stock returns. During the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated
with better stock market performance, especially for large banks. The strongest capital
position was notably better when using the leverage indicator rather than the risk-based
capital indicator.
Calomiris and Nissim (2014) studied changes in the market indicators of US banks
during the financial crisis, and the results showed that the declines in intangible assets
coupled with unrecognized contingent liabilities may explain the extent and persistence
of the decline of market indicators and indicators of equity value.
In the context of the financial crisis of 2007, the subject of systemic risk became very
important, especially after the aid given to the financial institutions that were systemat-
ically important at that time, which caused an increased expenditure of public resources
- especially in developed countries - to avoid the collapse of large institutions and the
consequent spread to the entire financial system.
Using the CoVaR approach to identify the determining factors of systemic risk, López-
Espinosa et al. (2012, p. 3150) did not find strong evidence that either size or leverage
contributes to increasing systemic risk in the context of internationally active banks.
Patro et al. (2013) presented a systemic risk indicator based on the correlation of the
return on stocks of financial institutions. They indicated that the increase in systemic
risk is highly influenced by the increase in the correlation between the idiosyncratic risks
of the banks, which tend to predict or coincide with important economic events such as
the crisis of 2007.
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Similarly, Weiß et al. (2014, p. 78) found no empirical evidence that bank size, leverage,
non-interest revenue, or bank asset quality are persevering determinants of systemic risk
in financial crises. The results show that global systemic risk is predominantly guided by
the characteristics of the regulatory regime.
Black et al. (2016, p. 107) calculated a distress insurance premium to determine the
systemic risks of European banks. This measure includes characteristics of the banks,
such as size, likelihood of default, and correlation. The results showed that the risk of
default on sovereign securities has a strong influence on systemic risk and that the specific
indicators of the banks (e.g., leverage) predict the systemic risk a year ahead.
In the context of the financial crisis of 2007, to verify the stability of the financial
system, Morris and Shin (2008, p. 229) presented the idea of a leverage constraint, not
from the traditional viewpoint of a buffer against the loss of assets, but as a result of the
stabilization of the institutions’ liabilities in a highly connected financial system.
Goddard et al. (2009) analysed the government measures taken in western Europe to
address problem banks during the crisis, and, under the new regulatory framework, banks
in the region should be less leveraged.
Clarke (2010) determined that the recent financial crisis called for a detailed analysis
of how some financial institutions had taken such high risks and how risk management,
governance, and the ethical environment allowed such risky situations for the institutions.
Furthermore, the relationship between leverage and other banking issues can be men-
tioned. Hughes et al. (1999, p. 292) studied the banking consolidation and mergers
of US banks and found evidence that the economic benefits of the consolidation are greater
for those banks engaged in inter-state expansion and, in particular, that which diversifies
the macroeconomic risks of the banks.
McAleer (2009, p. 831) studied the monitoring of market risk from the perspective of
the Basel II accord and found evidence that it encourages excessive risk-taking, due to
the high costs of accurate measures and risk projections.
Studies like the one by John et al. (2010, p. 383) examine CEO compensation
and the existence of two types of problems of agency, as follows: the classic owner-
manager agency problem and the problem of the change in risk between shareholders
and creditors. The results show that the sensitivity regarding the payment for CEO
performance decreases with the increase in the leverage indicator.
Braun and Raddatz (2010, p. 234) analysed when former politicians become directors
of banks, and they found that, at a micro level, banks that are politically connected are
larger and more profitable than other banks, despite being less leveraged.
Kishan and Opiela (2012, p. 573) analyze a monetary policy channel through the risk
pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit and the results show
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that contractionary policy boosts the sensitivity of jumbo-CD spreads to leverage and
asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks.
Using the classic capital structure classification between pecking order theory
and trade-off theory, Riccetti et al. (2013) used the dynamic trade-off theory to model the
leverage and financial structure of firms and the possible impact, in the case of default,
on the financial and equity situation of banks, as well as the impact on the stability
of the financial system, also covering the systemic risk and monetary policy of central
banks. Among other things, the results showed that if the leverage increases, the economy
becomes riskier, with a higher pro-cyclical leverage having a destabilizing effect that could
weaken the effect of the monetary policy.
Also resorting to the classical capital structure, from the perspective of Modigliani
and Miller (1958) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) explained
that high leverage is optimal for banks using a model that has enough friction to explain
a significant role in the production of liquidity claims. The model used has a market
premium for secured/net debt. Due to secured debt leading to a liquidity premium, risk
management plays an important role in the capital structure and leverage of the banks.
43
Chapter 3
Measuring Bank Leverage and its
Impact on Risk for Financial
Institutions
The banking system plays a fundamental role in the world economy. Any imbalance
in financial institutions can cause unprecedented systemic risk, as was witnessed by the
financial crisis of 2007.
One of the causes of this world crisis, as pointed out by the Basel Committee, was
the excessive leverage of financial institutions. According to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013),
before and after the crisis many banks apparently were in compliance with the minimum
capital requirements. However, considering the real scenario of the crisis, it was observed
that these banks did not have sufficient capital to absorb their unexpected losses, espe-
cially due to the adoption of new forms of financial intermediation adopted in the years
prior to the crisis such as, for example, the securitization of credit portfolios and derivative
transactions which made it difficult to identify the true leverage of the banking system.
Thus, mechanisms that limit the excessive degree of leverage of these institutions
should be adopted as part of banking regulations as suggested by (Dermine, 2015; Jarrow,
2013; Keeley, 1990; Wang, 2013). On the other hand, according to Papanikolaou andWolff
(2014), a great reduction in the leverage of banks would be detrimental to the prices of
the system’s financial assets, given the smaller offer of financial resources.
In order to establish more appropriate capital requirements for banks, the capital
agreement defined in BIS (2010), known as Basel III, stipulated new demands announced
in 2014 including the introduction of a capital indicator known as the Leverage Ratio
(LR).
According to the Basel guidelines, the Leverage Ratio is given by the fraction of Tier I
Capital over Total Exposure. Tier I Capital corresponds to the sum of Common Equity
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Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1 Capital, whose composition is defined explicitly in Brazil by
the Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil, 2013). Total Exposure, on the other hand,
measures the on-balance sheet exposure as well as the off-balance sheet exposure of banks
which, for example, includes various forms of guarantees (Banco Central do Brasil, 2014).
The LR is a simple metric that also contemplates traditional risk indicators such as
the Basel Index (BI).
The dominant vision of the literature is that the structure of banking capital is different
from the traditional structure of firms. Banks use their liabilities to obtain resources
and make loans and other intermediation operations. Debt is part of banking. In this
manner, banks are extremely leveraged when compared to non-financial firms. According
to Matthews and Thompson (2005), the leverage of traditional firms is roughly 0.6 times
their equity while banks typically operate with a leverage of 9.0 times their equity.
According to Ayuso et al. (2004), the decision-making model that banks adopt in
relation to capital is the result of a trade-off between three different types of costs related
to capital levels. First of all, there are the costs of remuneration, which are probably more
expensive than the costs of a bank’s alternative liabilities, such as deposits or debts, as
argued by Campbell (1979) and Myers and Majluf (1984).
Secondly, there are costs of adjustment which are due to changes in the levels of capital
and which are related to asymmetry of information problems in the capital markets. Since
those who make an initial stock offering have an informational advantage as opposed to
potential buyers, a stock offering or stock buyback can be viewed as a signal that the
company considers the market price to be out of keeping with the stock’s true value,
which will increase the pertinent adjustments (Ayuso et al., 2004).
Finally, there are the costs of bankruptcy, which include the loss of market value,
reputational risk and legal costs in the bankruptcy process (Acharya, 1996). In addition to
these costs are those related to capital requirements as stipulated by the Basel agreements.
It is important to point out that, if banks adopt the decision-making guidelines for capital
structure, according to the trade-off model banking capital will be stable over time, which
is a result that was not found to be true by Gropp and Heider (2010).
This study will analyze the influence of leverage in determining risk for financial in-
stitutions in Brazil. This leverage will be measured by a proxy of 4 (four) main leverage
components promulgated by the Basel Committee (on-balance sheet, derivative, repo op-
erations and off-balance sheet leverage) and risk will be measured by the risk indicator
zscore, according to Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014).
Thus, this section presents the data used for the empirical analysis, the model utilized
to solve the research question, the method of estimation of the parameters, and the
measurements of the goodness of the model’s fit.
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3.1 Data
This study follows the model used by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) which through an
analysis of panel data measures the risks to which financial institutions are subjected.
The authors analyze the operations of the current banking system and especially the
operations that do not appear on banking institution balance sheets.
In Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014), important findings were reported in relation to the
American banking system, in terms of the separation of on-balance sheet and off-balance
sheet leverage. In the current study, the objective is to observe the behavior of leverage for
on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet operations within the Brazilian banking system,
in order to verify possible impacts on the individual risks to banking institutions.
Considering data similar to the used in Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014), specific ac-
counting information from financial institutions has been collected as well as Brazilian
macro-economic variables. In particular, the following sources of information have been
utilized: the financial institutions report data on the Brazilian Central Bank’s website, in-
formation from the balance sheets of the Accounting Plan for Institutions of the National
Financial System (Cosif), the Risk Management Report - Pillar 3 (RGR-P3), available on
the internet websites of financial institutions, and macroeconomic data from the IBGE
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics).
The data used in this study was collected from accounting information from July 2001
to June 2018, and from December 2015 to June 2018 for information on leverage following
the guidance of BIS (2010). It’s important to point out that the leverage information,
according to the calculation defined by BIS (2010) was only published by Brazilian banking
institutions beginning in December 2015. For the macroeconomic data, the data used
covers the period from January 2002 to June 2018.
As established by BIS2010 and according to Brazilian legislation, the leverage variables
are measured by:
Row number Leverage Ratio
Instruction Billions Reais % da L21
On-balance sheet items
L1 On-balance sheet items (excluding derivatives
and SFTs, but including collateral)
6,473 79.0%
L2 Regulatory adjustments in determining
Basel III Tier 1 capital)
(171) -2.1%
L3 Total exposure on-balance sheet items 6,302 76.9%
Derivative Exposures
L4 Replacement cost associated with
all derivatives transactions
105 1.3%
Continuous in the next page.
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Row number Leverage Ratio
L5




L6 Gross-up for derivatives collateral
provided
0 0.0%
L7 Deductions of receivables assets for cash
variation margin provided
(0) 0.0%
L8 Exempted central counterparty leg of
client-cleared trade exposures
(12) -0.1%
L9 Adjusted effective notional amount of written
credit derivatives
14 0.2%
L10 Adjusted effective notional offsets and add-on
deductions for written credit derivatives
(1) 0.0%
L11 Total Derivative Exposures 191 2.3%
Securities Financing
Transactions (SFT)
L12 Repo and securities lending 964 11.8%
L13 Netted amounts of cash payable and cash
receivables of gross SFT assets)
(16) -0.2%
L14 Counterparty credit risk exposure
for SFT assets
65 0.8%
L15 Counterparty credit risk in
agent transaction exposures
83 1.0%
L16 Total SFT exposure 1,096 13.4%
Off-balance sheet
Exposures
L17 Off-balance sheet exposure at
gross notional amount
1,389 17.0%
L18 Adjustments for conversion to credit
equivalent amounts
(786) -9.6%
L19 Total off-balance sheet
exposures
603 7.4%
Basel III Tier 1 Capital and
Total Exposure
L20 Tier 1 Capital 664 8.1%
L21 Total Exposure 8,192 100.0%
Table 3.1: Leverage Ratio Disclosure Template
The absolute values and percentages of Total Exposure are described in the Table 3.1,
according to the data for the Leverage Ratio for June 2018, considering the macro-
segments B1, B2 and B4 of the Brazilian banking system, which consist of: commer-
cial, non-commercial or investment and development banks, thus covering in a complete
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manner all of the segment types of the Brazilian banking system. Table 3.2 shows the dis-
tribution of the frequency in relation to Total Exposure for information on the exposure in
terms of derivatives, SFT’s, on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet leverage for the period
with available data for the regulatory Leverage Ratio (December 2015 to June 2018, with
quarterly data), considering the data published by the Risk Management Report – Pillar
3 (RGPR-3), published by Brazilian banks on their respective websites which follow the
normative guidelines of the Basel Committee and the Brazilian Central Bank, revealing
the risk management process and the appropriate controls adopted.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
L3/L21(levreg) 1,463 0.448 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.860 1.000
L11/L21(derreg) 1,463 0.017 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.0004 0.327
L16/L21(comproreg) 1,463 0.072 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.706
L19/L21(offreg) 1,463 0.027 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.456
Table 3.2: Frequency Distribution - Leverage Ratio Disclosure Template
Time delimited data of leverage statements, which include information since Decem-
ber 2015 and also consider the criterion of pertinence, in which some risk figures in the
Table 3.1 represented 0% of the Total Exposure of the banking system, was opted to use
an accounting proxy for the leverage information of Brazilian banking institutions, with
data beginning in January 2001.
Thus, the regulatory indicators described in the Table 3.2 will be represented by the
accounting indicators described in Table 3.3, as follows: levreg for lev, derreg for der,
comproreg for compro and offreg for off. These proxy variables represent the Leverage
data in a significant manner, with the exception of the unavailability of the Cosif data for
variables L2 and L18 in Table 3.1.
In addition, to estimate the econometric model described in Section 3.2, the result
variables for the banking institutions have been used as instrumental variables for the
proposed model, representing the revenues derived from non-traditional banking business
operations as recder, recaplic and recserv. Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) use the same
logic to establish instrumental variables in their proposed model. These variables are
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Table 3.3: Accounting Variables
The dependent and independent variables utilized for the econometric model described
in Section 3.2 are listed in Table 3.3. The independent variables utilized are the leverage
variables, given that according to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013), the relationship between
the return on stocks compared to capital is stronger when the capital is measured by a
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leverage indicator instead of a risk-based capital indicator. In Papanikolaou and Wolff
(2014), the authors use on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet leverage variables and
revenue variables for these operations as instruments for these variables. We have followed
the same logic in this study.
To calculate the independent variable zscore, the measurement component of the indi-
vidual risk of financial institutions follows the Equation 3.1 as used by Papanikolaou and







where PL is equal to the equity of the banks as measured by the Cosif data fields
60000002 + 70000009 + 80000006, ROA is obtained by dividing an institution’s profits
(fields 70000009 + 800000060) by its total assets (Cosif data fields 10000007 + 20000004).
On the other hand, ROA is the annual standard deviation of the return on assets consid-
ering a window of 12 months.
Thus, the Zscore is composed of the sum of the returns on assets and the equity
divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets, turning it into a measure of
the risk of a bank’s insolvency. According to Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014, p.17), this
indicator combines profitability, capital risk and return volatility in a single metric. The
greater the indicator, the lower the probability of a bank failure.
In this study, in terms of the independent variables, the leverage variable lev is a
simple and traditional accounting measure that considers the total assets of institutions
divided by their equity according to Beltratti and Stulz (2012). In this measure of lev, the
total assets have been subtracted from the Cosif data fields 13300001 and 12100008, which
make up the leverage of the derivatives and repo operations, respectively. According to the
Table 3.1, this metric has an important proportional participation within the composition
of the leverage of Brazilian banking institutions.
Considering the leverage of derivatives in Brazil, over the counter derivatives make up
a small proportion of the market. Thus, instead of using the derivative variables der and
recder just for over the counter derivatives like Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014), for the
Brazilian case the total of derivative operations has been used.
In this way, der corresponds to the equivalent value of derivative credits divided by the
equity and recder corresponds to securities and derivatives revenues divided by the total of
these institutions’ operational revenues. This indicator refers to the best effort to collect
quality information from the Cosif chart of accounts to reflect the concepts of derivative
leverage. Thus, the result of this indicator is data field Cosif 71500003 (securities and
derivatives revenues) divided by total operational revenues, represented by the data field
50
Cosif 71000008.
The variables that represent the leverage of repo operations and securities lending
(compro and recaplic) are associated with some type of retention of risk or guarantee.
While compro consists of the repo operations of financial institutions, recaplic consists of
the revenues from interfinancial applications. The original Basel variable and the one used
by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) also use securities lending, however in the Brazilian
case this type of operation is relatively rare in the banking system.
Thus, in this study are used the variable compro, which consists of the data fields
Cosif 12100008, 42200002 and 42300005 divided by the total assets, defined as the sum of
data fields Cosif 10000007 and 20000004, as well as the variable recaplic, represented by
data field Cosif 71400000 divided by the total of operational revenues given by data field
Cosif 71000008.
The variables off and recserv constitute the limits of guarantees given by institutions
and service revenues respectively, which also appear in the accounting information. The
accounting information on credit limits are not represented in the variable off, due to
limitations in terms of the public accounting information that is available. However, this
variable represents well the variable conceived of by Basel, as can be seen in the Table 3.4.
Thus, the variable off consists of data field Cosif 30100004 (commitments) divided
by equity. The variable recserv consists of the result in the data field Cosif 71700009
(revenue from services), divided by the operational revenues in data field 71000008.
For greater robustness in the consideration of the accounting variables used as a proxy
for the leverage variables considered in this study, the Pearson correlation coefficient was
determined, which generated satisfactory results in terms of the representativeness of the
accounting variables as well as the leverage of Brazilian banks. In this test, was compared
the Cosif variables used and the original leverage variables. The results are displayed
in the Table 3.4. Thus, since the Pearson coefficient presents a satisfactory correlation
between the Cosif and leverage variables, one proxy of the variables originally proposed
by Basel was constructed, which corroborated the use of these indicators in the Table 3.3,
as in Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014).
3.2 The model
The functional relationship which is established in this work follows the example of Pa-
panikolaou and Wolff (2014), which was one of the pioneering articles in evaluating bank-
ing leverage both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet within the regulatory framework
of Basel 3. The work of these authors was designed to determine how modern banking
leverage affects the risk profile of banks. The authors studied American banks through
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L1 1 0.192 0.750 0.886 0.197 0.838 0.819 0.997
L11 0.192 1 0.226 0.172 0.875 0.141 0.139 0.146
L16 0.750 0.226 1 0.490 0.201 0.951 0.953 0.753
L19 0.886 0.172 0.490 1 0.175 0.539 0.510 0.883
L11_cosif 0.197 0.875 0.201 0.175 1 0.129 0.126 0.170
L16_cosif 0.838 0.141 0.951 0.539 0.129 1 0.999 0.839
L19_cosif 0.819 0.139 0.953 0.510 0.126 0.999 1 0.820
L1_cosif 0.997 0.146 0.753 0.883 0.170 0.839 0.820 1
Table 3.4: Regulatory and Cosif variables correlation
the construction of a data panel for the period from the first quarter of 2002 through the
third quarter of 2012.
According to Ozkan (2001, p.176), compared with cross sections data, panel data is
more flexible in terms of the choice of instruments used to control endogeneity. Also ac-
cording to Hsiao (1985, p.163), the use of panel data depends on the extent and reliability
of the data, as well as the validity of the restrictions that apply to the construction of the
statistical methods. In this work, the dynamic panel has been used to study leverage and
its impact on risk. According to Andrade and Tiryaki (2017, p.345), banking regulation
is one of the areas of economics and finance that justifies the use of dynamic panel data,
because current regulation depends on past measures. Thus, the functional relationship
to evaluate the effects of leverage on the individual risk to banks is represented by the
equation below:
Yit = Yit−1 + αi + β1,it∆levi,t + β2,it∆deri,t + β3,it∆comproi,t
+β4,it∆offi,t + γ1,itatcompi,t + γ2,itpascompi,t + δPIBt + δIPCAt + εit
(3.2)
where i = 1, 2, ...N = 71, t = 2002S1, ..., T = 33.
In the model, Yiq is equal to the zscore in its logarithmic form, as in Papanikolaou
and Wolff (2014) and Hossain et al. (2017). ∆leviq, ∆deriq, ∆comproiq, ∆offiq are the
average semester changes in lev, der, compro and off, respectively.
According to Andrade and Tiryaki (2017, p. 344-345), the inclusion of the lagged de-
pendent variable as an explanatory variable makes model persistence possible and verifies
shocks that have continuous effects over time, minimizing the serial correlation in terms
of error. According to the authors, the coefficient of this lagged variable can indicate
whether the impact of shocks increases or decreases over time. In the model, the lagged
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dependent variable is also used in a logarithmic form.
According to Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014), the reason why on and off-balance sheet
leverage variables are introduced in the model in first differences rather than levels is to
capture the effects of increasing (positive) and decreasing (negative) trends in terms of
bank risk.
Within this context, atcompit and pascompit are the specific control variables for the
banks, which seek to capture possible alterations in traditional banking services, according
to Berger et al. (2008), Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) and González (2005). atcompit
captures possible changes in bank loan activity. This measure is calculated by the net loan
and leasing divided by total assets. Pascompit captures possible changes in traditional
sources of bank financing, measured by banks’ total deposits over total liabilities. PIBt
and IPCAt are two macroeconomic variables. IPCAt measures the semester variation in
inflation, measured by IPCA, and PIBt measures the gross domestic product (PIB) and
market prices to evaluate the effects of business cycles on the process of adjustments to
the degree of banking leverage. The PIB variable is used in its logarithmic form.εit is the
error term , and α represents individual unobservable factors, while β, γ and δ are the
parameters to be estimated.
According to Andrade and Tiryaki (2017, p.345), the inclusion of the lagged variable
can create problems of endogeneity. Since Yt is a function of α, therefore Yt−1 is also a
function of α, where Yt−1 will be correlated with the error term, which makes the OLS
(ordinary least squares) estimator skewed and inconsistent. According to authors, fixed
and random effects models are not indicated for dynamic models with panel data.
Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) estimate the model by the two-stage least squares
instrumental variables (2SLS IV) model to deal with the potential problem of endogeneity,
given that covariates could be related as dependent variables. However, the regression
based on this method can generate skewed parameters when endogeneity exists, which
could lead to erroneous statistical inferences. The most recent literature advocates the use
of the estimation method for dynamic panel data system GMM, which has been prioritized
by this study. The expected results are displayed in Table 3.5.
The relationship between atcomp and risk is considered positive by Papanikolaou and
Wolff (2014), when both stable economic periods and crises are evaluated. However,
the same relationship is expected to be negative by Weiß et al. (2014), when periods of
financial crises are considered. In the present analysis, given that the larger the zscore,
the smaller the risk incurred by a given banking institution, a positive relationship is
expected between atcomp and zscore during periods of economic stability. Or in other
words, the larger the proportion of credit operations in a banking institution, considering
these operations to be typical of banking business, the lower the individual risk to the
53
Independent variable Expected result with dependent variable
at_comp (+) Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014)
(-) Weiß et al. (2014) (crise)
pas_comp (+) Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) e Mendonça and Silva (2017)
lev e off (-) Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) e Vallascas and Keasey (2012)
der e
compro (-) Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014)
Inflation (IPCA) (+) Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014)
(-) Vallascas and Keasey (2012)
(-) ou (+) Weiß et al. (2014)
PIB (+) Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014)
(-) Mendonça and Silva (2017), Marques Pereira and Saito (2015)e Vallascas and Keasey (2012)
(-) ou (+) Weiß et al. (2014)
Table 3.5: Expected results
institution.
The expected result between pascomp and risk shows the positive relationship in not
only Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) but also an applied study of the Brazilian banking
system where Mendonça and Silva (2017) analyze the effect of banking and macroeconomic
variables on systemic risk. In these studies, the findings show that an increase in the
proportion of deposits in banking liabilities reduces this risk.
The leverage, derivative exposure, repo operations and off-balance sheet variables have
a negative relationship with the zscore variable in Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014), consid-
ering periods of financial stability. These results are similar to those found by Vallascas
and Keasey (2012), considering the relationship between on-balance sheet and off-balance
sheet variables and the resilience of banks to systemic shocks. In this sense, both authors
found results that indicated that the greater the exposure to these operations, the greater
the risk incurred.
In relation to the macroeconomic variables IPCA and PIB, the results and the rela-
tionship with risk depend on their context. Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) find a positive
relationship between these variables and the zscore, independent of whether it is a period
of crisis or not, which implies a lower risk of bank insolvency with the increase of these
variables.
Meanwhile Vallascas and Keasey (2012) finds a relationship between the growth of
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these variables and an increase in systemic risk, as Marques Pereira and Saito (2015) and
Mendonça and Silva (2017) find a relation to the growth of PIB and an increase in bank
risk in Brazil. Weiß et al. (2014) on the other hand, in an applied study of financial
crises, emphasizes that the behavior of these variables depends on the type of crisis that
has occurred.
3.3 Estimation of the parameters
To evaluate the relationship between banking leverage and the risk indicator, the pa-
rameters will be estimated using the estimator used by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998), known as the system GMM, which is designed to correct the
problem of weak instruments. According to these authors, variables with lagged levels
are weak instruments for first difference variables, considering the stationarity of these
variables. The estimation strategy is similar to that used by Brei and Gambacorta (2016)
in studying leverage in relation to the business cycle in a panel for fourteen countries.
Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest the utilization of GMM with future orthogonal
deviations. According to Andrade and Tiryaki (2017, p.354), this procedure subtracts
the average of all future observations for units in cross section, which means that the
last unit of time’s observation is lost instead of the first, as occurs with difference GMM
(Arellano and Bond, 1991), eliminating the individual effect in cross section.
Blundell and Bond (1998) shows the use of conditions of additional moments in rela-
tion to the original estimator used by Arellano and Bond (1991). According to Blundell
and Bond (1998), this version of the system estimator tends to be better than the differ-
ence GMM estimator due to the use of the level and difference equation, where lagged
level variables are instruments for difference variables and the difference variables are
instruments for the level variables.
Also, as demonstrated by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998),
the estimator of the two stage system coefficient is more efficient compared to the one
stage system. However, one problem that comes with the two stage estimator is that the
asymptotic standard errors can be overestimated especially when the number of instru-
ments is equal to or greater than the number of cross sections (Beck and Levine, 2004).
One adjustment that can be made is to reduce the number of instruments, limiting to
the number of observations, which is what we have done in this work. It also uses the
finite sample correction for the two stage variation matrix calculation as suggested by
Windmeijer (2005), in order to generate more robust estimates.
Thus, the parameters were estimated for the R software through the PLM package.
The parameterization used for the system GMM was: (a) oneway, individual effect, which
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makes it possible to use unobservable individual effects, (b) two steps model, in which
this model changes the weighting matrix in order to achieve more consistent estimates, (c)
collapse instruments, which make the clusterization of instruments possible, as mentioned
by Roodman (2009) and (d) a robust covariance matrix, mentioned by Windmeijer (2005),
which makes it possible to generate more accurate estimates.
According to Hausman (2001), the statistic instruments implemented in the econo-
metric analysis are variations of the same theme. The variables recder, recaplic, recserv
and the lagged variable zscore are considered to be instruments in the estimation of the
parameters by the GMM system method, considering a range from 2 to 6 lags. These
utilized instruments follow the instruments proposed by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014),
which are variants of the same theme of the variables der, compro and off in the model
presented in this work.
Thus, recder expresses bank activities in the derivative and securities markets, in
the same line as the der variable, but from the perspective of the results of these types
of operations. In turn, recaplic represents the revenues from financial applications and
recserv the revenues of services, in which these variables represent the variables generated
through repo operations and also financial institution services, and thus they constitute
variables related to the same theme, but presented in a different manner.
The other model variables were not considered as GMM instruments but rather normal
instruments with one lag: der, compro, off, lev, atcomp, pascomp, PIB and IPCA.
3.4 The model’s goodness of fit
The system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998) requires stationarity data to produce consistent estimates. To verify the
fulfillment of this condition, we performed unit root tests as proposed by Levin et al.
(2002) and Im et al. (2003), which are abbreviated as LLC and IPS.
According to Baltagi (2008, p.240), the LLC test performs individual unit tests for each
cross-section and assumes that there is independence among the individuals in the panel
data. The null hypothesis is that each series contains a unit root, while the alternative
hypothesis is that the series are stationary. This test is indicated for panel data of
moderate size with values of N between [10; 250] and T between [25; 250]. The basic
hypothesis is:
∆yit = ρyi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
ΘiL∆yi,t−L + αmidmt + εit. (3.3)
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in which dmt indicates the vector of the deterministic variables and αmi corresponds
to the coefficient vector for the model m = 1, 2 e 3. Specifically, d1t = ∅, d2t = 1 and
d3t = 1, t.
According to Baltagi (2008, p.240), since the lag order is unknown, a regression is
estimated for each cross-section separately. The lag order pi can vary among individual
banks. For a given T , choose the pmáx and examine through the t statistic ΘˆiL whether
the lag order of the previous cross section is a better fit. Once pi is defined, two auxiliary
regressions are realized ∆yit on ∆yi,t−L and dmt; and yi,t−1 on ∆yi,t−L and dmt to obtain
eˆit and νˆit−1, respectively, where L = 1, ...pi.
According to Baltagi (2008, p.242), the LLC test is restrictive to the extent that it
requires that ρ is homogeneous in relation to the different i. Thus, the test proposed by
Im et al. (2003) (IPS) permits the heterogeneity of the coefficients yi,t−1 and proposes a
procedure for an alternative test based on individual statistics of the unit root tests.
According to Baltagi (2008, p.242), the (IPS) test possesses the null hypothesis that
each panel series contains a unit root, because it permits heterogeneity in the autoregres-
sive parameter of the first order under the alternative hypothesis that there is a unit root
for some (but not all) individual banks in the panel:
H1 = ρi < 0parai = 1, 2, . . . N1; eρi = 0parai = N1 + 1, ...N. (3.4)
The auto-correlation test of the residuals in Arellano and Bond (1991) proposes the
hypothesis that there will not be an auto-correlation of the second order for first difference
equations in the specifications of the proposed model. Therefore, it should fulfill the
following hypotheses: 1) the non-correlation of lagged data (above the second) of the
regressors in level with the first differences between errors; 2) the non-correlation of the
first differences of regressors with an error in level.
In addition, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggests using the Sargan test of the above-
mentioned restrictions, where one can verify the null hypothesis whether the group of




In this chapter we will present the most relevant results in reference to the analyzed data
and the estimation of the parameters, indicating the main impacts of leverage on the risk
in the Brazilian banking system.
First, we will realize a descriptive analysis of the leverage of the banking system, ex-
ploring the variables used in this study, their statistical measurements and the correlation
between the variables.
Second, we will present the results of the estimation of the parameters, considering the
methods of estimation OLS, fixed effects and system GMM and its specifications, such as
the placement of model variables using differences and also separating banks by their type
of activity (commercial and non-commercial banks), in order to verify the leverage factors
which generate risk for the banking system, with it being important that the regulatory
authorities adopt appropriate prudent measures so that financial market agents are aware
of the risks they are incurring.
Finally, we analyze the quality of the used model using the robustness and unit root
tests LLC and IPS.
4.1 Descriptive analysis of the leverage of the bank-
ing system
The descriptive statistics of the study variables are presented in Table 4.1, including the
variables used in the econometric model (der, compro, off, lev, atcomp, pascomp, PIB and
IPCA), in accordance with Section 3.2, the instrumental variables applied in the GMM
estimation method and the variables roa and volroa, which are components of the zscore
variable.
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
roa 2,343 0.006 0.024 −0.242 0.001 0.011 0.185
der 2,343 0.165 0.464 0.000 0.000 0.091 6.112
compro 2,343 0.195 0.210 0.000 0.040 0.282 1.435
off 2,343 0.560 1.122 0.000 0.007 0.546 18.741
lev 2,343 7.063 5.952 0.084 3.002 9.254 43.529
recder 2,343 0.312 0.275 0.000 0.067 0.502 0.994
recaplic 2,343 0.094 0.134 0.000 0.019 0.104 0.947
recserv 2,343 0.049 0.087 0.000 0.005 0.060 0.804
atcomp 2,343 0.368 0.256 0.000 0.141 0.548 0.983
pascomp 2,343 0.423 0.290 0.000 0.169 0.657 0.989
volroa 2,343 0.024 0.039 0.0002 0.005 0.026 0.368
zscore 2,343 22.521 24.984 −0.911 8.089 27.297 289.177
pib (bi) 2,343 1,972 863 709 1,136 2,769 3,350
ipca (perc) 2,343 3.114 1.548 1.180 2.300 3.590 8.990
Table 4.1: Descriptive analysis of the model’s variables
In the descriptive analysis of these variables, a few outliers were observed such as, for
example, a maximum leverage of 43.529, which refers to a bank which had successive losses
for 5 (five) semesters. These losses substantially decreased the equity of this institution,
making its leverage extremely high. After these losses, the shareholders of this bank
invested new financial resources and its leverage became stable again.
In relation to the zscore variable, the minimum negative value refers to the same bank
with maximum leverage, which presented negative roa during this period. On the other
hand, the maximum value of the zscore refers to a bank with little activity in financial
operations which has a equity close to the size of its assets.
To avoid the effects of outliers in the proposed estimation models, the component
variables of the model were winsorized at 5% of the minimum and maximum levels.
Finally, in the Table 4.2, a Pearson correlation test was realized for the variables
utilized in this model.
4.2 Results of the estimation of the parameters
The Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the results of the estimation of the parameters considering
the regressions used in the OLS method, panel data with fixed effects and the system
GMM method. The results obtained comparing different estimators are designed to give
more robustness to the presented results, according to Mendonça and Silva (2017) and
Marques Pereira and Saito (2015). It’s important to point out that all of the regressions
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der 1 0.024 0.059 0.229 0.411 -0.125 -0.059 -0.257 -0.214 -0.087
compro 0.024 1 -0.046 -0.014 0.021 0.554 0.022 -0.387 -0.047 0.035
off 0.059 -0.046 1 0.184 0.011 -0.147 0.104 0.037 -0.082 -0.040
lev 0.229 -0.014 0.184 1 0.060 -0.093 0.117 0.044 -0.008 -0.032
rec_der 0.411 0.021 0.011 0.060 1 -0.305 -0.127 -0.540 -0.463 -0.151
rec_aplic -0.125 0.554 -0.147 -0.093 -0.305 1 -0.064 -0.242 0.104 0.228
rec_serv -0.059 0.022 0.104 0.117 -0.127 -0.064 1 -0.136 0.058 -0.048
at_comp -0.257 -0.387 0.037 0.044 -0.540 -0.242 -0.136 1 0.361 0.091
pas_comp -0.214 -0.047 -0.082 -0.008 -0.463 0.104 0.058 0.361 1 -0.005
z_score -0.087 0.035 -0.040 -0.032 -0.151 0.228 -0.048 0.091 -0.005 1
Table 4.2: Model’s variables - Pearson correlation
used in the system GMM estimation method do not reject the null hypothesis of the
Sargan (J-statistic) test and, in this manner, the overidentifying restrictions are valid. In
addition, the serial auto-correlation AR1 and AR2 tests do not indicate the presence of
serial auto-correlation.
The specification denoted by 1-OLS in the Table 4.3 is compose of the control variables,
as in Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014). The 2-OLS specification, on the other hand, is made
up of control variables along with other variables from the Section 3.2. The fixed effects
3-FE specification displays the parameters found with this method of estimation, except
for the macro-economic variables. The results for the Table 4.3 are in line with those
found in the 1-GMM specification of the Table 4.4, which represents an overall sample
of banks, except for the statistical significance of the compro and off variables, which
represent repo operations and off-balance sheet operations.
Meanwhile the Table 4.4 is presented by the system GMM two steps model with the
following specifications: an overall sample of the banks, (denoted by 1-GMM ), commercial
banks (2-GMM ), non-commercial or treasury banks (3-GMM ) and foreign banks (4-
GMM ). It seeks, with this analysis, to identify specific leverage profiles within this group
of banks, according to the classification proposed by Capelleto (2006).
In these models, the variables der, compro, off and lev are placed in first differences, in
accordance with Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014), in order to verify a dynamic relationship
between these variables and the zscore variable.
According to Mendonça and Silva (2017), the number of instruments utilized in the
specifications that use the system GMM method were limited by the number of observa-
tions, in this case, to the total number of banks in the sample, to avoid the excessive use










lev −0.016∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
at_comp 0.758∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.094) (0.094)








Observations 2,340 2,340 2,340
R2 0.037 0.129 0.082
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.126 0.067
F Statistic 29.866∗∗∗ (df = 3; 2336) 43.163∗∗∗ (df = 8; 2331) 34.136∗∗∗ (df = 6; 2301)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01




(1-GMM) (2-GMM) (3-GMM) (4-GMM)
lag(z_score, 1) 0.054∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.137∗ −0.047
(0.025) (0.039) (0.073) (0.031)
der −0.322∗∗∗ −0.089 −0.429∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.094) (0.067) (0.099)
compro 0.069 0.190∗ −0.228∗ −0.053
(0.068) (0.105) (0.138) (0.125)
off −0.013 −0.022 0.098∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
lev −0.018∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
at_comp 0.669∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ −0.393∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.110) (0.189) (0.120)
pas_comp −0.309∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.043 0.163
(0.085) (0.081) (0.162) (0.132)
ipca −0.055∗ −0.042 −0.106∗∗ −0.120∗∗
(0.031) (0.027) (0.045) (0.061)
pib 0.180∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014)
Bancos 71 55 16 24
Períodos 33 33 33 33
Observations 2343 1815 528 792
J-stat and p-value 32.247 (0.404) 32.711 (0.383) 31.453 (0.443) 31.841 (0.424)
AR(1) and p-value −6.305 (0.000) −4.568 (0.000) −3.927 (0.000) −6.649 (0.000)
AR(2) and p-value −1.371 (0.170) 0.481 (0.630) 0.380 (0.703) 0.798 (0.425)
Wald test and p-value 18.604 (0.000) 26.396 (0.000) 3.681 (0.000) 3.264 (0.000)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.4: Regression Results 2
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zscore (lag), recder, recaplic and recserv and the number of lags used by these instruments
were limited to a range of 2 (two) to 6 (six).
Considering the parameters of the control variables atcomp, a positive and statistically
significant relationship was found, as in Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) during periods of
financial stability (without crises), except for the 3-GMM model (treasury banks).
Thus, the expected result is found for the overall total sample of the banks and for
the groups consisting of commercial banks and foreign banks (specifications 1-GMM, 2-
GMM and 4-GMM), demonstrating that, the larger the proportion of credit operations in
financial institutions, the greater the predominance of typical banking activity operations
and the lesser the presence of those deemed to be unusual banking business operations.
In this way, leverage through traditional loan activities presents less risk to the stability
of Brazilian banking institutions.
For the 3-GMM specification, the relationship between atcomp and the zscore is nega-
tive and statistically significant at a 5% level, which may signify that within the treasury
banking segment, the greater the proportion of credit operations, the riskier the finan-
cial institution is, given that this group’s main focus is not typical commercial credit
operations. This is an important study point: leverage in terms of traditional loans has
different impacts depending on the type of financial institution.
Considering the control variable pascomp, it is negative and statistically significant at a
1% level obtained for the general sample (specification 1-GMM) and the commercial bank
sample (specification 2-GMM), which is different from the findings of Papanikolaou and
Wolff (2014) and Mendonça and Silva (2017). This later study found pascomp to be an
important factor in the stability of Brazilian banking institutions in relation to systemic
risk, given that the proportion of deposits over the total liabilities of the institutions is
seen as a cushion against the appetite of banks for risk to increase their credit portfolio,
reinforcing the perception that the use of fundraising from unusual sources could be a
possible weakness of these banking institutions. Bearing in mind that the measurement
of systemic risk is different from the measurement of individual bank risk, the results of
the regressions may have a differential impact when the institutions are analyzed in an
isolated manner.
It should be noted that this negative relationship was not found in a statistically
significant manner for specifications 3-GMM and 4-GMM, which may mean that the
proportion of deposits in the liabilities of these banks is not a significant source of risk,
given that these institutions receive few deposits from individuals, the traditional form of
funding for commercial banks.
Considering the variables that present on and off-balance sheet leverage (lev, der,
compro, off ), the variable compro presents a positive and significant relationship at a
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10% level in the specification presented for commercial banks (2-GMM). In Brazilian
commercial banks, this variable is concentrated on repo operations with federal securities
guarantees, which thus constitute a lower source of risk for these institutions. For the
specification of non-commercial banks (3-GMM), this relationship has been found to be
statistically significant also at a 10% level, however in this case with a negative sign. The
results suggest that these repo operations for treasury banks are riskier, possibly because
they involve private securities guarantees rather than federal securities. The results for
Brazilian treasury banks are in line with those found by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014)
for the American banking system during the period before the financial crisis of 2007.
Meanwhile for foreign banks (specification 4-GMM), this relationship did not present
statistical significance.
The lev variable, on the other hand, presented significance at a 1% level for all of the
specifications, in line with the findings of Vallascas and Keasey (2012) and Papanikolaou
and Wolff (2014) for the period before the 2007 crisis. Thus, this relationship shows that
the greater the leverage of institutions, the greater the risk that is incurred. Given that
the leverage of financial institutions, for the most part, contains an element of risk of
defaults occurring in these operations, which would have a potential negative impact on
banking results, the study’s findings are to be expected.
The der variable presented a negative significant relationship at a 1% level for the
specifications of treasury and foreign banks, as was obtained by Papanikolaou and Wolff
(2014). Given that these segments usually perform more structured financial operations
which are less conventional than commercial banks, there is a need to have greater pro-
tection for these operations. In addition, foreign banks realize transactions in foreign
currency with their head offices, making it necessary to hedge against these operations.
The off variable presents a positive significant relationship at a 1% level in the specifi-
cations for treasury and foreign banks which suggests that for these segments an increase
in off-balance sheet operations is less risky. More specifically, the results are compatible
with this type of business for these segments which realize various forms of guarantees
with their headquarters or foreign affiliates, which tend to be less risky for business. Our
findings for this variable differ from Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014), which presented a
negative relationship between the off variable and the zscore variable before the crisis of
2007.
These results demonstrate the relevance of these variables for the Brazilian case, even
though the financial market for derivatives and off-balance sheet operations is not as
robust as the American market studied by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014). However,
the Brazilian derivative market is considerably more transparent and regulated than the
American market. The results may suggest that the impact of off-balance sheet operations
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could be influenced by the particular characteristics of the banking environment in each
country.
For Brazil, the study indicates that depending on the segment analyzed, no typical
banking operations represented by der and off, as well as typical banking operations
represented by the lev and compro variables have relevant weights in explaining banking
risk.
The results of the macroeconomic parameters PIB and IPCA display a statistically
relevant relationship in the presented specifications, especially, with significance at a 1%
level for the PIB level and significance at a 5% level for the IPCA variable for treasury
(3-GMM) and foreign (4-GMM) banks, in line with the results of Papanikolaou and Wolff
(2014) for the PIB variable and in line with the results of Vallascas and Keasey (2012)
for the inflation variable.
It can be inferred from these results that, for the individual stability of Brazilian bank-
ing institutions, the macroeconomic variables presented possess a significant contribution
to individual risk. For the PIB variable, a positive adjustment to the level of bank risk
in relation to business cycle effects can be noted. On the other hand, the IPCA variable
shows that an increase in a country’s inflation can increase the individual risk of banking
institutions in the treasury and foreign segments.
Considering the lag zscore variable in the GMM system specifications, the results of
the parameters show a positive relationship with this variable which is significant at a
5% level for the specifications 1-GMM and 2-GMM and at a 10% level for the 3-GMM
specification. Given that the dynamic models for panel data use this variable to verify
its relationship with the current variable, in these cases we found that the individual risk
was dependent on the risk during the previous period. However, the parameters found
have values close to zero, indicating that the variable is not persistent, or in other words,
adjustments in terms of banking institution risk occur quickly.
4.3 Results of the model’s goodness of fit
As robustness test, the method of estimation and the respective results found in the
specifications of the Table 4.4 were obtained considering alterations in the estimation
procedures. To accomplish this, we considered: the system GMM one step estimation
model, according to the results of the Table 4.5, estimation results for the variables der,
compro, off and lev in levels and not in differences, as in Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014),
whose results are demonstrated in the Table 4.6 and also, in order to use a smaller number
of instrument variables, we utilized a range from 2 to 5 lags for the instrument variables
GMM recder, recaplic, recserv and the lagged zscore variable, and also considered the
65
variables der, compro, off and lev using in levels and not in differences, according to the
Table 4.7.
In the comparison of the Tables 4.5 and 4.4, the results produced were very similar
to those found by the two-steps method cited by (Arellano and Bond, 1991) (Blundell
and Bond, 1998). For the presented specifications, the signs of the parameters remain
the same. In relation to the statistical significance of the parameters, in general using
the one-step method, the parameters present greater significance. In the 2-GMM-1ST
specification for commercial banks, the macro-economic variable IPCA has statistical
significance at a 5% level and for the 4-GMM-1ST specification, the outdated zscore
variable has significance to a 10% level.
According to the results of the Table 4.6, using the variables der, compro, off and lev in
levels, it may be observed that the signs of the parameters remain the same, except for the
variable compro for specification 4-GMM-L, but this does not have statistical significance.
In relation to the statistically significant alterations compared to the results of the Table
4.4, the compro variable has statistical significance in relation to the dependent variable
zscore, as well as the off variable, considering the overall banking sample (specification
1-GMM-L). Meanwhile, the lagged zscore variable does not have statistical significance in
terms of levels for this specification, which shows that when the leverage variables are used
in differences there is a dependent relationship with past risk, which is not found when
these variables are examined in terms of levels. Considering the 2-GMM-L specification
for commercial banks, the variables der, off and IPCA have statistical significance, while
the variable lev is not statistically significant. For the 3-GMM-L specification for non-
commercial banks, the lagged zscore, compro and atcomp variables do not have statistical
significance while the pascomp variable does. Lastly, for the 4-GMM-L specification, the
pascomp variable has statistical significance while the IPCA variable is not statistically
significant.
Also, as can be seen in the Table 4.7, the GMM system estimation method was
tested using lags ranging from 2 to 5 for GMM instrument variables, in order to use
the fewest number of instruments, as in Roodman (2009), and the variables der, compro,
off and lev using in levels. The findings were similar to those for 2 to 6 lags, as in
Table 4.6. The specifications presented did not display alterations in the signs of the
parameters with the change in the number of lags used. In relation to the significance of
the parameters obtained compared to the results of the Table 4.6 for the specifications
1-GMM-L5 and 4-GMM-L5, the variables off and atcomp had statistical significance
at a 10% level respectively. For the specification 2-GMM-L5, on the other hand, the
parameters of the variable IPCA did not present statistical significance.




(1-GMM-1ST) (2-GMM-1ST) (3-GMM-1ST) (4-GMM-1ST)
lag(z_score, 1) 0.053∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗ −0.047∗
(0.020) (0.031) (0.058) (0.028)
der −0.318∗∗∗ −0.090 −0.431∗∗∗ −0.385∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.076) (0.057) (0.091)
compro 0.067 0.189∗∗ −0.267∗∗ −0.060
(0.057) (0.075) (0.108) (0.122)
off −0.014 −0.023 0.096∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021)
lev −0.018∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
at_comp 0.665∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ −0.344∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.086) (0.164) (0.111)
pas_comp −0.311∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.041 0.144
(0.080) (0.073) (0.156) (0.107)
ipca −0.055∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.036) (0.049)
pib 0.181∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.016) (0.012)
Bancos 71 55 16 24
Períodos 33 33 33 33
Observations 2343 1815 528 792
J-stat and p-value 33 (0.369) 32.954 (0.371) 33 (0.369) 32.966 (0.371)
AR(1) and p-value −5.935 (0.000) −4.191 (0.000) −4.006 (0.000) −5.885 (0.000)
AR(2) and p-value −1.340 (0.180) 0.543 (0.587) 0.581 (0.561) 0.729 (0.466)
Wald test and p-value 30.394 (0.000) 48.671 (0.000) 5.033 (0.000) 3.822 (0.000)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01




(1-GMM-L) (2-GMM-L) (3-GMM-L) (4-GMM-L)
lag(z_score, 1) 0.020 0.057∗ 0.035 −0.014
(0.026) (0.033) (0.067) (0.032)
der −0.544∗∗∗ −0.359∗ −0.411∗∗∗ −0.481∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.203) (0.103) (0.149)
compro 0.646∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ −0.155 0.122
(0.103) (0.129) (0.156) (0.221)
off −0.049∗∗ −0.049∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.054) (0.046)
lev −0.008∗∗ −0.003 −0.068∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
at_comp 0.770∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ −0.266 0.459∗∗
(0.075) (0.097) (0.261) (0.187)
pas_comp −0.375∗∗∗ −0.263∗∗∗ −0.400∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.081) (0.229) (0.114)
ipca −0.052∗ −0.034∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.093
(0.029) (0.020) (0.048) (0.069)
pib 0.187∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.019) (0.015)
Bancos 71 55 16 24
Períodos 33 33 33 33
Observations 2343 1815 528 792
J-stat and p-value 32.411 (0.397) 32.749 (0.381) 31.517 (0.440) 31.831 (0.424)
AR(1) and p-value −6.394 (0.000) −11.657 (0.000) −5.551 (0.000) −4.710 (0.000)
AR(2) and p-value −1.500 (0.133) −0.527 (0.597) 0.100 (0.920) 0.919 (0.357)
Wald test and p-value 17416 (0.000) 20290 (0.000) 4205 (0.000) 3943 (0.000)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01




(1-GMM-L5) (2-GMM-L5) (3-GMM-L5) (4-GMM-L5)
lag(z_score, 1) 0.024 0.058∗ 0.018 −0.015
(0.028) (0.033) (0.066) (0.036)
der −0.544∗∗∗ −0.353∗ −0.421∗∗∗ −0.517∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.204) (0.106) (0.182)
compro 0.658∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ −0.153 0.127
(0.109) (0.136) (0.148) (0.242)
off −0.048∗ −0.051∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.056) (0.051)
lev −0.008∗∗ −0.003 −0.068∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
at_comp 0.765∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ −0.272 0.404∗
(0.075) (0.111) (0.250) (0.241)
pas_comp −0.372∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗ −0.377∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.087) (0.216) (0.127)
ipca −0.053∗ −0.031 −0.127∗∗ −0.082
(0.030) (0.025) (0.052) (0.078)
pib 0.186∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.021) (0.015)
Bancos 71 55 16 24
Períodos 33 33 33 33
Observations 2343 1815 528 792
J-stat and p-value 32.250 (0.223) 32.551 (0.212) 30.925 (0.274) 31.498 (0.251)
AR(1) and p-value −5.785 (0.000) −2.671 (0.007) −2.797 (0.005) −4.789 (0.000)
AR(2) and p-value −0.940 (0.347) −0.162 (0.871) 0.037 (0.970) 0.660 (0.508)
Wald test and p-value 17037 (0.000) 19678 (0.000) 3874 (0.000) 3361 (0.000)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.7: Regression Results 5
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conducted, as described in Section 3.4. The unit root tests conducted by Levin et al.
(2002) and Im et al. (2003) were performed using the purtest function of the PLM package
for the R software. The parameters presented were obtained using intercepts as well as
intercepts and trend lines. As verified by the Table 4.8 , the null hypothesis that temporal
series have unit roots was rejected. Therefore, the stationarity of the panel is verified,













Table 4.8: Unit root tests results- model’s variables
4.4 Implications of the Findings
The study has relevant implications for the stability of the Brazilian banking system. For
example, the result that traditional accounting (on-balance) sheet leverage is an impor-
tant source of individual risk for Brazilian banks, has been corroborated for most of the
specifications. The macro-economic variables linked to inflation (IPCA) and economic
growth (PIB), also influence the risk for Brazilian banking institutions. For commercial
institutions, the adjustment of individual risk occurs quickly, as indicated by the lagged
zscore variable. Within this context, the Brazilian case is significant, considering its highly
uncertain environment with widely varying rates of growth and inflation.
The results of the specification of commercial banks are very close to the specification
of the sample as a whole, which can reflects the concentration of the Brazilian banking
industry among a few commercial banks. For this segment, the control variables that
measure the composition of the assets and liabilities have statistical significance in relation
to the individual risk of banks, indicating that the variation of these activities implies
greater or lesser risk. Thus, commercial financial institutions should be attentive to their
portfolios of assets and liabilities and their respective risks in terms of credit and banks
runs, in order to maintain stability in their operations. For this segment, derivative
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operations and off-balance sheet items did not present evidence of sources of risk. For the
Brazilian market, these operations are not usual banking business, are little explored by
commercial banks, and are usually used for more specific goals in other business niches.
In this sense, for treasury or non commercial banks a negative relationship has been
found between derivative operations and the incurred risk. It should be noted that in this
segment this type of operation is riskier given that these banks generally operate in this
market not just to protect possible operational losses as well as increasing the returns
of their security portfolios. On the other hand, the relation between off-balance sheet
operations with risk is positive, indicating that these operations do not raise great concerns
among market agents and regulatory bodies. It should be noted that the relationship
between the composition of the assets and individual risk is negative for treasury banks
unlike the findings for commercial banks. In this way, for this segment it displays a
relationship that is different from the composition of portfolio for the commercial banks,
given that this segment does not have a large proportion of credit operations. Thus,
this segment possesses a negative relationship between repo operations in several of the
specifications, which could indicate a source of risk for this type of operation and possible
interest on the part of regulatory bodies.
In terms of foreign banks, the business model for this segment will generally subsidize
the relationship between the headquarters and a Brazilian affiliate, with the operations
of these banks generally displaying behavior that is different from domestic banks. It
may be due to the fact that this segment receives funds from the headquarters and few
deposits from individuals that there is a positive relationship between individual bank
risk and the composition of the institution’s liabilities, which is significant for several
specifications. Also, just as for treasury banks, foreign banks possess an important source
of risk in the form of derivative operations, which are essentially designed to protect
against oscillations in foreign currency rates. Looking at off-balance sheet operations, the
positive relationship found with the individual risk of banks indicates lesser concern on
the part of market agents and regulatory bodies, given that often these operations deal
with a variety of types of guarantees provided by the foreign headquarters to subsidize
the operations of the Brazilian affiliate.
However, we should emphasize the limitations of the empirical analysis that we have
conducted. The choice of the time period for the data, the number of sample observa-
tions and the selected variables, as well as the estimation method itself, are results of the
best efforts devoted to this study of Brazil, and unlike Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014),
it concerns an emerging financial market as compared to a developed (American) finan-
cial market. Also, Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) analyzes systemic risk as well as the
individual risk for institutions. The present work, given the limitations of the market
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information available, measures just the individual risk for institutions.
In this way, these findings are important for market participants to evaluate the costs
and benefits of the operations that they are subject to, given that some types of operations
are riskier than others, and also for regulators so that they may apply norms that are





Excessive leverage on the part of world banking institutions has been of concern to reg-
ulatory bodies and has now led to new regulations. Thus, those who research banking
leverage now associate this subject with various types of risks that institutions face.
In this study, we have sought to identify the influence of leverage on the determination
of risk for the Brazilian banking system. First of all, we conducted a bibliographic review
of the area, gathering together the main studies concerning bank leverage within the con-
text of the prudential regulation of capital. Secondly, we have constructed an accounting
proxy to measure the influence of Brazilian banking leverage on the risks faced by these
institutions.
In relation to the bibliographic review, based on the ranking of the Association of
Business Schools, the selected references display clear results that relate the subject of
banking leverage regulation to important objects of study within the fields of finance and
economics, such as Financial Stability, Credit Risk and Systemic Risk.
Considering the bibliometric metric used, the literature review has its limitations. By
changing criteria, articles can be included or excluded from the sample. The categories
of the objects of study can also be modified, depending on the researcher’s interests and
approach. That being said, the structure of the metric for the bibliometric revision utilized
offers important results and possibilities for future studies.
Of the sample of articles, 46% have financial stability as their objects of study, and it
is interesting to note that these articles were published after the 2007 crisis. Before the
financial crisis of 2007, important works mainly examined Moral Risk featuring the use
of deposit insurance on the part of financial institutions.
It should be emphasized that Credit Risk considering the microprudential approach
was the most often cited object of study, which is an important and expected result, given
that it is one of the greatest risks to which financial institutions are exposed.
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A gap in the studies of leverage was identified in terms of emerging countries, which
represent the context for only 6% of the articles studied.
Given the analysis conducted of network, in terms of the size of its circumferences, in
which the articles are measured by the largest number of co-citations (measured by the
number of links), we observe that the articles by Gropp and Heider (2010) and Keeley
(1990) are the most relevant in this analysis, which makes them references in researching
the subject of banking leverage, which vary in accordance with the specific cluster to
be studied. In terms of the co-word analysis results, conducted through the keywords
selected by the authors, they indicate potential terms to be considered by researchers
and potential future studies related to the subject of banking leverage. In addition to
the central terms banking, capital, regulation, basel and their variations, the keywords
systemic risk, financial crisis and liquidity were the most often used, which demonstrates
the force of the macroprudential approach to studies related to bank leverage along the
lines advocated by BIS (2010).
Given that Financial Stability was the most often found object of study, it should be
emphasized that, according to Acharya and Thakor (2016), microprudential and macro-
prudential regulation do not only act in an independent manner, but also display a certain
amount of tension between them. Thus, it may be considered important to not only exam-
ine macroprudential studies, which were the dominant approach in the literature before
the 2007 financial crisis, but also microprudential studies beyond those linked to Credit
Risk, which were well represented in the sample of articles studied. As an example, we
can consider studies of Bank Runs as well as other microprudential objects of study and
their relation to macroprudential objects of study, which the current work establishes as
a suggestion for future research.
In relation to econometric estimations, the results offer interesting insights for super-
vision and banking regulation. Considering the overall sample of banks, derivative and
on-balance sheet operations are the riskiest for Brazilian financial institutions. However,
considering this specific segment, it has been verified that derivative operations are the
riskiest for non-commercial banks, and on the other hand, off balance sheet operations
have a positive relationship with risk in these banking institutions. Given that the focus
of this type of segment is not typical banking operations of financial intermediation, such
as credit operations and deposits, these results seem compatible with the business model
of these institutions.
For commercial banks on the other hand, the parameters found for the control vari-
ables of traditional banking businesses composed of assets and liabilities indicate the
importance of monitoring this type of operation for this segment, given that these banks
realize their activities focused on typical operations of financial intermediation, such as
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credit operations and raising funds through deposits by individuals. The findings for this
segment indicate that the greater the proportion of credit operations among its assets, the
lower the risk that these institutions will incur, and they also indicate that there is greater
risk when there is a predominance of short-term funding in the liabilities of this banking
segment. Considering that the Brazilian market is vulnerable to crises and instability,
these results are in line with the country’s economic environment.
For foreign banks, the results point out that derivative operations are a source of risk
for this segment, as they are also for treasury banks. In this sense, given that foreign
banks realize, in a general manner, currency hedging operations due to their exposure to
foreign currencies with their headquarters and that they seek potential gains from this
type of operation, these results provide important information for banking supervision
and regulation, and the monitoring of these activities.
For the specifications examined, the macroeconomic variables have an impact on the
risk for individual banking institutions, with the PIB variable being the most significant.
Thus, public policy and the macroeconomic environment have a significant relationship
with banks’ appetite for risk, which should be considered when analyzing the banking
environment.
Finally, the supervision of banking regulation should take into account the type of
segment which banks operate in to monitor the risks incurred due to banking leverage
in the most assertive way. Possible financial intermediation operations which are part of
the business model of a given bank do not exactly fit into the activity of a bank within
another segment, which makes these particularities important to the monitoring of risk
diversification policy and any possible instability in the banking system.
Future studies, given the complexity of the banking system and the diversity of risks
that banking institutions are subject to, could work with other metrics and indicators of
the risk exposure of these institutions. For example, they could measure the impact of
leverage on the systemic risk of the Brazilian market or utilize other measures of the risks
for individual financial institutions which are different from those used in this work.
The regulatory information regarding leverage that has been promulgated by the Basel
Committee under the guidance of the Central Bank of Brazil, will be available in greater
quantity, given that it began to be publicized in December 2015. We suggest the utilization
of this official information for risk analyses of Brazilian banks in future studies.
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